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[Wittrs] "Internal" Speech [message #4138] Thu, 25 March 2010 12:09
Cayuse is currently offline  Cayuse
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Registered: August 2009
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Philosophical Investigations:

347. "But at least I know from my own case what it means 'to say things to
oneself'. And if I were deprived of the organs of speech, I could still talk to
If I know it only from my own case, then I know only what I call that, not
what anyone else does.

348. "These deaf-mutes have learned only a gesture-language, but each of
them talks to himself inwardly in a vocal language." -- Now, don't you under-
stand that? -- But how do I know whether I understand it?! -- What can I do
with this information (if it is such)? The whole idea of understanding smells
fishy here. I do not know whether I am to say I understand it or don't under-
stand it. I might answer "It's an English sentence; apparently quite in order -- that
is, until one wants to do something with it; it has a connexion with other
sentences which makes it difficult for us to say that nobody really knows what
it tells us; but anyone who has not become calloused by doing philosophy
notices that there is something wrong here."

349. "But this supposition surely makes good sense!" -- Yes; in ordinary
circumstances these words and this picture have an application with which we
are familiar. -- But if we suppose a case in which this application falls away we
become as it were conscious for the first time of the nakedness of the words
and the picture.

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