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| Topic: [Wittrs] Digest Number 350 |
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| [Wittrs] Digest Number 350 [message #5568] |
Fri, 10 September 2010 05:13 |
 WittrsAMR
Messages: 1
Registered: October 2009 |
Junior Member |
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WittrsAMR
WittrsAMR
Messages In This Digest (2
Messages)
1.
Re: [C] Digest Number 349
From:
Rajasekhar Goteti
2a.
Re: Understanding Property Dualism
From:
walto
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1.
Re: [C] Digest Number 349
Posted by: "Rajasekhar Goteti"
wittrsamr@freelists.org
Thu Sep 9, 2010 8:00 am (PDT)
July 25, 2010, 5:26 PMThe Limits of the Coded WorldBy WILLIAM EGGINTON
The New York times Thursday, sept 9 2010 Opinion
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/images/blogs_v3/opinionator/opinionator_post.png
We have no reason to assume that either predictability or lack of predictability has anything to say about free will.While our senses can only bring us verifiable knowledge about how the world appears in time and space, our reason always strives to know more.
The belief that our empirical exploration of the world and of the human brain could ever eradicate human freedom is an error.As much as we owe the nature of our current existence to the evolutionary forces Darwin first discovered, or to the cultures we grow up in, or to the chemical states affecting our brain processes at any given moment, none of this impacts on our freedom. I am free because neither science nor religion can ever tell me, with certainty, what my future will be and what I should do about it. The dictum from Sartre that Strawson quoted thus gets it exactly right: I am condemned to freedom. I am not free because I can make choices, but because I must make them, all the time, even when I think I have no choice to make.
One may pl see the full article in The New York Times / Opinion /dt http://graphics8.nytimes.com/images/misc/nytlogo153x23.gif
thank you
sekhar
--- On Thu, 9/9/10, WittrsAMR@yahoogroups.com <WittrsAMR@yahoogroups.com> wrote:
From: WittrsAMR@yahoogroups.com <WittrsAMR@yahoogroups.com>
Subject: [C] [Wittrs] Digest Number 349
To: WittrsAMR@yahoogroups.com
Date: Thursday, 9 September, 2010, 2:54 PM
WittrsAMR
Messages In This Digest (2
Messages)
1a.
Re: Understanding Property Dualism
From:
gabuddabout
2a.
Re: [C] Digest Number 347
From:
iro3isdx
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Messages
1a.
Re: Understanding Property Dualism
Posted by: "gabuddabout"
wittrsamr@freelists.org
Wed Sep 8, 2010 5:15 pm (PDT)
--- In WittrsAMR@yahoogrou ps.com, "walto" <wittrsamr@. ..> wrote:
>
>
>
> --- In Wittrs@yahoogroups. com, "BruceD" <blroadies@> wrote:
> >
> >
> > > SWM wrote:
> > >
> > > "everything in the universe is physical: some of it is also mental."
> >
>
> Stuart is right. That was a misattribution of something I said.
>
>
>
> > I'm wondering on what basis he choose this rather than "everything > in
> > the universe is mental: some of it is also physical."
> >
>
> The reason is that I believe that what I wrote is true (though I don't deny that it's controversial) while its converse that you suggest above as a substitute is quite obviously false, Spinoza, Fechner, and Galen Strawson notwithstanding.
>
> W
I (probably wrongly, so you tell me) used to think (haven't thought about it for a long time) that Spinoza's doctrine of mode parallelism might (might) be thought of as a version of a wedding of the correspondence and coherence theory of truth such that insofar as we have correspondence we assume a sort of parallelism and insofar as we have coherence, we have something like the mental mode being what it is, even though the Spinoza, like moderns, had some sort of identity theory when defining mind as the thought of the body, which does sound idealistic in one sense and downright modern in another.
Cheers,
Budd
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2a.
Re: [C] Digest Number 347
Posted by: "iro3isdx"
wittrsamr@freelists.org
Wed Sep 8, 2010 10:11 pm (PDT)
--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups. com, Rajasekhar Goteti <wittrsamr@. ..> wrote:
> responding to http://groups. yahoo.com/ group/Wittrs/ message/6277
> sekhar:
> What does the group say about this article?
It would have helped if you had provided a link to the article.
It appears to be:
http://www.nytimes. com/2010/ 09/05/books/ review/Bickerton -t.html
I don't think you can easily separate language from culture.
Sure, in one sense language is a cultural artifact. However, our
ability to use language is biological. For that matter, our capacity
to be part of a culture is biological.
Deutscher seems to be particularly interested in whether grammar is
biological - presumably he is addressing some of Chomsky's claims. On
that, I agree with Deutscher that grammar is cultural, contrary to
Chomsky. But we shouldn't take that too far. Our biology surely
constrains the kind of grammar we are likely to use in our languages.
Regards,
Neil
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2a.
Re: Understanding Property Dualism
Posted by: "walto"
wittrsamr@freelists.org
Thu Sep 9, 2010 8:03 am (PDT)
--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "gabuddabout" <wittrsamr@...> wrote:
>
>
>
> --- In WittrsAMR@yahoogroups.com, "walto" <wittrsamr@> wrote:
> >
> >
> >
> > --- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "BruceD" <blroadies@> wrote:
> > >
> > >
> > > > SWM wrote:
> > > >
> > > > "everything in the universe is physical: some of it is also mental."
> > >
> >
> > Stuart is right. That was a misattribution of something I said.
> >
> >
> >
> > > I'm wondering on what basis he choose this rather than "everything > in
> > > the universe is mental: some of it is also physical."
> > >
> >
> > The reason is that I believe that what I wrote is true (though I don't deny that it's controversial) while its converse that you suggest above as a substitute is quite obviously false, Spinoza, Fechner, and Galen Strawson notwithstanding.
> >
> > W
>
> I (probably wrongly, so you tell me) used to think (haven't thought about it for a long time) that Spinoza's doctrine of mode parallelism might (might) be thought of as a version of a wedding of the correspondence and coherence theory of truth such that insofar as we have correspondence we assume a sort of parallelism and insofar as we have coherence, we have something like the mental mode being what it is, even though the Spinoza, like moderns, had some sort of identity theory when defining mind as the thought of the body, which does sound idealistic in one sense and downright modern in another.
>
> Cheers,
> Budd
You're interpretation may well be the right one (it was all highly controversial the last time I looked), but I was referring to the panpsychism of those philosophers, which is pretty clear. For all of them (and a number of others too, natch), every physical entity is also a mental entity.
W
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| Topic: A Real Wittgenstein Compilation? |
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| A Real Wittgenstein Compilation? [message #5525] |
Sun, 29 August 2010 16:40 |
RetroDeathRow
Messages: 70
Registered: January 2010
Location: Texas |
Member |
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Well, I have spent some of my free time & money in the effort to spread the word of LW. Some people get paid $10/hour to talk about environmentalism, others to preach Obamacare, and even others Scientology. Well, I mentioned I was planning to set up a table with a sign that read 'He had a wonderful life' and distribute TLPs. Well, that is exactly what I have done on a few occasions.
To say the least, it is a little expensive. At $10 bucks a pop from Barnes & Nobles, I am restricted to but usually 3 copies per distribution. Besides that, I really don't care for a New Introduction on top of Bertie's by some random guy. Bertie's ain't bad if taken as ironic, but that is neither here nor there.
Currently I am seeking out the possibility to cheaply produce some copies of the TLP. I don't have much experience with editing and my tools (MS Word) ain't much, but I have been carefully recreating the TLP. I'll probably upgrade to Photoshop simply to speed up the process, but that also in neither here nor there.
I am unsure as to whether the works of LW are public domain (other than the TLP which is by year of publication). The Nachlass is public domain, right? But does that mean an Anshcombe translation is public domain, or is the translation the sovereign creation of people other than LW?
Well, there is a legal section on these forums ;P
If the copyright in the US is life+50years, does that mean everything LW wrote is in the public domain? It seems some think so, but I really don't know for sure. Any help would be appreciated in securing the legality for the publishing and distributing of free, unlicensed copies of Ludwig Wittgenstein's work(s).
Which works? I am glad you asked. I surmise this would not be an essential, robust, and clean presentation of LW's works, but I am no expert and so would need additional input on other works.
1. Lecture on Ethics
it is short and deliberate and 100% LW, unlike other lectures. It makes for the perfect introduction to not just the TLP, but LW in general. And it is non-technical, unlike Bertie's introduction.
2. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
with the preface by LW, of course. It was the first and only thing he published. It could feasibly come before the Lecture on Ethics, but this is such a technical work.
3. Philosophical Investigations
with the preface by LW, of course. A good compilation of LW will include the TLP and PI, and these works are timeless. But should the PR and PG or Blue&BrownBooks be with the mix?
4. Zettel
this book is beautiful. I think it makes for a wonderful addition to the TLP and PI not as another finished work, but as LW's personal selection of his various manuscripts. That the TLP and PI are so wonderful for their order and this book is unordered leaves an ellipse in some sense...
.................................................................
I recommended the Recollections of Wittgenstein recently and would be thrilled if most of that could also be published, but I am inclined to think this is not public domain. Maybe the authors and/or publishing company is feeling benevolent in regards to some words about LW?
.................................................................
O Philosophical Remarks
it is a typescript, though practically in finished form. But then, all it seems to me is another exposition of LWs method, which can be taken from lectures or the TLP- and what of remarks on color? Many remarks from it can be found in Zettel.
I Philosophical Grammar
this typescript is simply not in a finished form. The PI and Zettel zre much preferable.
V Big Typescript
is this a fairly finished typescript? I don't know, but it sounds as so. It's addition could be a bit excessive and would arguably be nothing more than an elaboration upon the TLP- which needs little if any elaboration, imo.
X Blue & Brown Books
aka preliminary studies for the PI. The benefits of this work is that it is arguably not mingled as notes but is simply dictation. This could be a transition to the PI, similar as how the Lecture on Ethics introduces the TLP. But then, much of this work is reproduced in the PI.
OI Remarks on Color
I really don't know. I haven't read it. Is it publishable, or just a mess of notes? No need to take everything the man wrote as authorized or even essential. This work does take place after the PI, iirc, and may then be a nice iteration of the PR in the PI style.
OV On Certainty
Again, I don't know, having not read this piece. But even if this one is a mess of notes, it is regarded as quite original and intense- leaving all the stages of revision out- which could be relevant.
OX Lectures on _____________
there are various sets of lectures, which are nice for scholarship but I don't believe to be essential. Albeit, LW is famous for his contribution to the Philosophy of Mathematics and, as chance would have it, we have a unified set of lectures on mathematics- but I think it is unified by three authors. Four would have been nice. I did enjoy the few that I read, but none of the lectures would be public domain.
Any significant other works?
.................................................................
Well, I ain't asking for any funds and wouldn't dare take any, but I will surely share my files for publication should they ever see the light of day. Again, any input would be greatly appreciated. What other help could I ask of y'all?
Peace,
John O'Connor 
He had a wonderful life.
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| Forum: Book Recommendations or Announcements |
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| Topic: [Wittrs] Editions of the Tractatus |
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| [Wittrs] Editions of the Tractatus [message #4968] |
Thu, 03 June 2010 16:46 |
RetroDeathRow
Messages: 70
Registered: January 2010
Location: Texas |
Member |
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There have been numerous reprints of W's single published work, the TLP. I have but one copy because I am satisfied with it. My views on the various prints are expressed hereforth.
Go with the CK Ogden translation; W approved of it.
Go with a hardcover copy from before 1960, therefore assuring that not only are you not purchasing a McWhatshisname "improved translation", but also so that you do not find yourself with a significantly altered "CK Ogden" translation (like the Barnes&Nobles variant).
1933 and after have some minor corrections (spelling and stuff?), but there is arguably still a couple instances of missing periods (nevermind the english English spellings).
1955 is the year they added the index, which I think is a welcome addition to the TLP. It doesn't seem complete, and the FIND function works well on electronic versions; still, co complaints from me.
1922 goes for a few thousand dollars... 
I have a '55 edition. Gave away my '59 edition. Don't spend more than $20 on a copy within my preferences, if you can help it.
[Updated on: Fri, 09 July 2010 22:24] by Moderator
He had a wonderful life.
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| Topic: The BIG Typescript |
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| The BIG Typescript [message #4967] |
Thu, 03 June 2010 16:23 |
RetroDeathRow
Messages: 70
Registered: January 2010
Location: Texas |
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http://www.amazon.com/Big-Typescript-German-English-Scholars/dp/1405106999
http://www.bookfinder.com/search/?ac=sl&st=sl&qi=jZ8A2fd08taB13jaX7I,L 13A0tg_6562872139_1:54:346&bq=author%3Dludwig%2520wittgenstein%26title%3Db ig%2520typescript%2520ts%2520213%2520german-english%2520scholars
I didn't even know this was out! I have the chapter called "Philosophy" in the Philosophical Occasions but have yet to start on the Philosophical Grammar. But there it is, the biggest, baddest, TS W ever worked on.
Well, I do not know that it is the baddest, I am rather fond of the PI as well as the Blue/Brown/Yellow books. Still, I remarked on all the "psychological" printings authored by W and Sean took to it quickly (I wonder how he is faring). There are, like those publications, little in way of reviews.
Any word?
[Updated on: Fri, 09 July 2010 17:46] by Moderator
He had a wonderful life.
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| Topic: [Wittrs] [blog] On Why a New Translation of Philosophic Investigations Was Published |
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| [Wittrs] [blog] On Why a New Translation of Philosophic Investigations Was Published [message #2296] |
Sun, 15 November 2009 19:41 |
Squarespace Services
Messages: 14
Registered: October 2009 |
Junior Member |
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Sean Wilson <whoooo26505@yahoo.com> added On Why a New Translation of Philosophic Investigations Was Published:
... regarding G. E. M. Anscombe's translation and the need for a new edition, Hacker and Schulte offer the following in the 4th edition of Philosophical Investigations:
"Anscombe's translation was an impressive achievement. She invented an English Equivalent for Wittgenstein's distinctive, often colloquial, style. This was no mean feat. For she had to find not only English analogues of Wittgenstein's stylistic idiosyncracies, but also an English rhythm that would convey the character of Wittgenstein's carefully crafted prose. Her success is indisputable.
Nevertheless, there are errors of different kinds in ... [Philosophic Investigations]. It was because of these that the Wittgenstein editorial advisory committee agreed to the production of a new edition. But, given the excellence of the Anscombe translation, it was resolved that rather than making a completely new one, we should build on Anscombe's achievement and produce a modified translation, rectifying any errors or misjudgements we discerned in hers. It should be emphasized that many of the errors in the ... [older editions of PI] could not have been identified in the 1950s, prior to the availability and extensive study of the Wittgenstein Nachlass, some crucial items of which did not come to light until decades later." (4th Edition PI, page viii).
Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq.
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| Forum: Wittgenstein and Mathematics |
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| Topic: [Wittrs] re AI (excerpts from Math Forum) |
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| Topic: [Wittrs] More re: Operation DuckRabbit... |
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| [Wittrs] More re: Operation DuckRabbit... [message #5428] |
Sun, 15 August 2010 20:11 |
kirby urner
Messages: 213
Registered: August 2009
Location: Portland, Oregon |
Senior Member |
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Calling my project Operation DuckRabbit is somewhat new. I'm alluding to Philosophical Investigations Part 2 especially, which is about the gestalts we associate with meaning. Despite all that "meaning as use" stuff, the importance of *showing* (not just saying) gets lost in the shuffle if we forget about duckrabbits and other such switcheroos.
My contention has been (and continues to be), that serious-minded philosophers would do well to look at one of the important gestalt switches in 1900s philosophy, what has come down to us in 2010 as Martian Math, at least in my neck of the woods.
The appended link to Notes for Teachers sets the stage: imagine a tribe (sounds like Wittgenstein already), that doesn't consider the Cube to be its model of 3rd powering, uses the Tetrahedron instead (topologically simpler, works well in a ball-packing context).
We get right to the foundations of mathematics with such a consideration, plus we turn the key in what might otherwise be a locked (inaccessible, or perhaps verboten) branch of literature, much of it philosophical and contemporary in nature.
Operation Duckrabbit is about recruiting those schooled in philosophy to apply their understanding of Wittgenstein to this gestalt changing challenge. As the late Dr. Arthur Loeb would remark, crystallographers have something to learn from this alternative more 60-degree-shaped bias. Instead of orienting everything around the cube, other gestalts emerge and hook together -- if one works at it, deliberately fosters the requisite changes in consciousness.
I think we're nearing a time when literacy in Wittgenstein's philosophy will include the concrete example of Martian versus Earthling math, though the narrative may assume a different guise. A lot of fruitful investigations branch out from this tension, this unity-of-opposed-concepts, more than just one or two investigators might handle.
We need more explorers in this "geometry of thinking", seems to me. There are real world implications, as unlocking Fuller's treasure trove (like a pirate stash) is to unleash a cornucopia (the inverse of Pandora's Box). What better way to be a hero then? And if you're already well versed in Wittgenstein, well, you've already got an edge.
Kirby Urner
Oregon Curriculum Network
Portland, Oregon
Notes for Teachers
http://www.4dsolutions.net/satacad/martianmath/teacher_notes.html
Background Reading (a previous post to this list): http://coffeeshopsnet.blogspot.com/2010/07/on-wittgenstein-and-fuller.html
More about Martian Math c/o BFI blog:
http://bfi.org/news-events/community-content/martian-math-and-synergetics
Re: Operation Duckrabbit:
http://coffeeshopsnet.blogspot.com/2009/12/duck-rabbit.html http://coffeeshopsnet.blogspot.com/2009/10/on-wittgensteins-philo.html ==========================================
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| Topic: [Wittrs] Language games in mathematics.... |
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| [Wittrs] Language games in mathematics.... [message #5257] |
Thu, 22 July 2010 20:10 |
kirby urner
Messages: 213
Registered: August 2009
Location: Portland, Oregon |
Senior Member |
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ANTHROPOLOGY IN PHILOSOPHY: THE OTHERS
The anthropological bent in Wittgenstein's writings, especially his later
ones, has been much remarked upon in the secondary literature.
He of course wrote 'Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bow' i.e. provided
direct commentary on an anthropological work. More subtle though,
is his invocation of "tribes" who perform thus and so, as distinct from
a more familiar pattern. To hold up the mirror to ourselves, he draws
from anthropology to invent "the others" (if you've watched 'Lost' the
TV series, "the others" will maybe resonate).
In the realm of mathematics, you find the same language game idea.
Indeed, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (RFM) and
Philosophical Investigations (PI) are dove-tailing works in a lot of ways.
The simple drawings or cave paintings, hints at visual proofs, sometimes
involving gestalt flips perhaps (new meanings), ties RFM to PI Part 2
especially (where "seeing according to an interpretation" gets more
of a focus).
The maxim "all math is ethno-math" might be a suitable bumpersticker
for a Wittgensteinian to sport on her or his car (metaphysical vehicle,
or "bizmo" as the case may be). One doesn't rise above ethnicity
to some higher truth. Truth is colored by ones cultural lenses, right
to the core, because "I am my world" and "My culture lives through me"
would be Tractatus-compatible maxims as well.
What "my culture" might mean is not a simple given, is not a function
of one's passport or other paperwork. Philosophers breed themselves
into a wide variety of alien being (allusion to 'Men in Black'), so I use
the word "ethnicity" with no special attachment to any one broadly
recognized category. "Schools of thought" (partially overlapping)
would be another approach to the same airport.
Regarding "ethnicity" I'm more inclined to think of 'Nell' and of "Nell World",
'Nell' being a movie starring Jodie Foster. She's self taught in isolation,
as if raised by wolves. Does nature herself have a grammar? Curious
minds want to know.
INVENTING WORLDS
Philosophers have more in common with J.R.R. Tolkien or C.S. Lewis
sometimes -- more than they'd like to admit in some cases. A philosopher
may move into a mental castle, a fortress of solitude, of her or his own
design -- sign of craziness or genius, depending on whom you talk to or
what the neighborhood is like.
They invent their own worlds.
"An ethnicity of one" might be the bumper sticker, reminiscent of a
US Army recruiting campaign.
Given the prevalance of the "students construct their own reality"
meme (or models thereof), it's not surprising that the most earnest
students might take this to heart, and really do some original thinking.
A one-of-a-kind individual is the concluding unscientific postscript to
any supposedly "objective" history, was Kierkegaard's insight. The
subjective voice has a shot at being existentially authentic, as the
grounding terminus for some narrative, whereas the objective voice
never does (part of what makes the movie 'Idiocracy' so funny: the
narrator intones in that know-it-all voice associated with "objective
documentaries" and yet is ridiculously biased, to the point of
sneering -- a good mirror for all those nature flicks, ala Wild Kingdom).
In a philosopher, in other words, we may come close to a private
language, fully recognizing the oxymoronic character of such a thing.
The oxymoronic character of "private language" is deeply reflected
upon in the PI, and relates to the solipsism of the TLP.
A MATHEMATICAL LANGUAGE GAME
The language game (ethnicity) I've been looking at lately might be
loosely labeled Archimedean. I say "loosely" in part because many
of the Archimedean polyhedra (so-labeled) are not used, plus the
octagonal prism creeps in, needed to define a so-called "characteristic
tetrahedron", six of which build a cube (three left handed + three
right handed). The characteristic tetrahedron has edge ratios of
root(1) : root(2) : root(3), which people like.
I don't say "square root" when writing "root" because that's an
ethnicity I'm holding up a mirror to. Imagine a tribe that doesn't
say "squaring" or "cubing" because its models of 2nd and 3rd
powering involve triangles and tetrahedra respectively. Squares
and cubes simply don't enter into it.
As background, lets recall that Aristotle (not Archimedes) is
reputed to have claimed that "tetrahedra fill space", a proposition
almost universally decried as incorrect, because readers are
thinking of the regular version. However, as D.M.Y. Sommerville
chronicled in 1923, Kantian conceptual space is tessellated by
at least four tetrahedral space-fillers, each acting alone and
requiring no left and right mirroring.
These would be the Mite, Rite, Bite and quarter Rite (I'm using
more contemporary terminology). Their volume ratios may be
set at 1/8, 1/4, 1/4 and 1/16 respectively, within the philosophy
in question (entitled 'Synergetics' by its author, a post linguistic
turn metaphysician and/or American Transcendentalist, of we
might admit of such a species -- requires some bendings
of meanings perhaps, some operational revectorings).
All math is ethno-math.
Here's a divergence, a fork in the road, from that private
"Nell World" of rectilinear thinking, a solipsistic gravity well
inhabited by a truly prevalent mindset (the dominant paradigm
or philosophical grammar).
Escaping from the "squares and cubes" fly bottle is no easy task.
Gestalt flips needed. Wittgensteinian therapy could be just the ticket.
One might well imagine a philosophy class in which, in order
to make Wittgenstein more intelligible, the ethnic nature of
mathematics would be rehearsed. So-called "gypsy math"
might be introduced, with a traveling circus of geeks, a troupe,
showing off the main features. One of the first hurdles to overcome
involes a cube of edges root(2). Instead of the expected volume
of root(2) to the third power, its volume is three. How could that
be? A logically consistent, yet different model of 3rd powering
gets used. And we're off an running, watching the puzzle pieces
fall into place.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
What's interesting is having mathematics upwell on the humanities
side of the fence, if we're still admitting to such a fence (or
"chasm" as the case may be).
Philosophers are now able to tunnel directly into the heart of
established spatial geometry and appreciate the power of a
logical paradigm to anchor a way of life. Change the logic,
and lifestyles change accordingly, for the better sometimes.
Change the geometry, and the geography changes, the vista,
the landscape, the outlook. The kinds of buildings you build, the
goals that you set, the time frames you think in -- all are
related to ethnicity and shift when the grammar shifts (the
form of life).
Or is "geometry" simply substituting for "ontology" or "belief system"
at this juncture, with "geography" a stand in for "the world".
Is "geometry" the same as "logic", "geography" the same as
"history"?
That depends on the namespace. Be a Hegelian of you want to
be, try that hat on for size. Kierkegaard is suspicious of the
grand systematizers, the positivists (with good reason), but that
doesn't mean every cathedral-like edifice has to be torn down.
Systems, like sand castles, come and go, have a life span,
a half life. These may be marvelous and perform work.
The PI / RMF does not sound the death knell for logical systems,
nor for mathematics. Wittgenstein is not a nihilist. His philosophy
leaves everything as it is, while remaining a tool for removing
cruft and clutter (like a broom). His philosophy creates space
for new ethnicities, e.g. new kinds of engineer, and may live on in
their teachings.
Kirby
==========================================
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| Topic: [Wittrs] Logicomix (a graphic novel with Wittgenstein in the cast) |
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| [Wittrs] Logicomix (a graphic novel with Wittgenstein in the cast) [message #4869] |
Sat, 15 May 2010 12:25 |
kirby urner
Messages: 213
Registered: August 2009
Location: Portland, Oregon |
Senior Member |
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I wanted to alert list readers to a graphic novel
entitled Logicomix, an Epic Search for Truth.
Here's a picture of the cover:
http://coffeeshopsnet.blogspot.com/2010/05/buzz-about-shops.html
Some of the art within:
http://www.flickr.com/photos/17157315@N00/4608127370/
The plot line is on two levels, akin to 'Titanic' (the movie) in
that there's a contemporary cast, the people actually doing
the comic, and the 1900s cast. Bertrand Russell frames
the latter by telling his life story in a lecture hall, with the
audience mostly wanting to hear his views on whether the
USA should enter WW2 against Germany. Most of those
present are vocally against this idea and know Russell is
a pacifist, so want to hear him take their side.
However, in the contemporary cast is a computer scientist
who is keen to keep the logic and mathematics front and
center. He debates with the other authors regarding focus
and themes.
Wittgenstein is prominent in these pages, although the
storyline only takes us through Logico-Tractatus and Vienna
Circle. Philosophical Investigations is not mentioned.
This is a fictional work and does not follow the literal facts
of what happened. There's a movie-like dimension, which
isn't to say a graphic novel is just a storyboard for a film
(my friend who gave me this to read talked at length about
how upset the 'Watchmen' and 'V for Vendetta' guy was
with any movie adaptation of his work).
Wittgenstein pops his head into Russell's office and
proceeds to be intense and passionate, sometimes
challenging Russell's patience while also digging under
the foundations of his ideas. LW then goes to the front
lines (existentially as well as literally), then later sends
the manuscript for the TLP. The school teacher scene
shows him being a badass with the kids i.e. physically
abusive. In contrast, Russell and his new wife are trying
out their liberal ideas about schooling. Russell judges
their experiment a failure.
A core theme of the work is the relationship between
logic and madness or rationality and irrationality. Russell's
quest for certainty is set against the backdrop of a lonely
childhood wherein truths are deliberately kept from him.
This core theme traces back to Greek philosophy,
including some of the great tragedies. A contemporary
cast member is involved with the staging of these plays,
Orestes in particular. How to reconcile these countervailing
aspects of the human psyche?
http://www.flickr.com/photos/17157315@N00/4608126464/sizes/l/in/photostream/
Those intimately familiar with the more factual biographies
of the 1900s cast may feel too many liberties are taken w/r
to what actually transpired.
The authors are mostly wanting to get across some
ideas and see the historical narrative as somewhat
secondary.
In interludes wherein the contemporary cast has discussions,
we learn more about their focus and commitment to getting
the ideas to come through accurately, with changes to
facts a tool for doing that.
An addendum explains this again, with a quote from
El Greco.
I no longer have said tome in front of me, having lent it
to someone else. It came from our local library.
I cite this work at Math Forum, where I post a lot of my
thinking.
http://mathforum.org/kb/message.jspa?messageID=7067602&tstart=0
(author names and publisher given).
Kirby
==========================================
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| Topic: [Wittrs] Family resemblance and Mathematics |
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| Topic: [Wittrs] Fwd from a Fuller School list: mentions Wittgenstein (RFM) |
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| [Wittrs] Fwd from a Fuller School list: mentions Wittgenstein (RFM) [message #3710] |
Thu, 04 March 2010 15:32 |
kirby urner
Messages: 213
Registered: August 2009
Location: Portland, Oregon |
Senior Member |
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Here's some recent dialog regarding philosophy, with a mention of
Wittgenstein's Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics about
half way through.
Under discussion is this sculpture in a Zen garden (imaginary OK)
we're calling the "concentric hierarchy" of nested polyhedra (similar
to pictures Kepler used to draw, associated with Neo-Platonism).
This extends my "tetrahedral mensuration" theme on this list,
with links to such anchoring essays as this one to Math Forum:
http://mathforum.org/kb/thread.jspa?threadID=2047973&tstart=15
My thesis in brief is that too many philosophers are missing out
on one of the big stories of our day, because of the fragmented
(narrowly splintered) nature of the discipline. Those of us in the
Wittgenstein camp have an opportunity to dream weave it together
more, and not just because of the H.S.M. Coxeter connection,
although that's also part of the story.
Related reading:
http://controlroom.blogspot.com/2010/02/new-essays.html
Kirby
================================
--- In synergeo@yahoogroups.com, "John Brawley" <jb@...> wrote:
>
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "coyote_starship" <kirby.urner@...>
>
> > --- In synergeo@yahoogroups.com, "John Brawley" <jb@> wrote:
> >>
John:
> >> Eh? I don't know; I wasn't thinking about volumes, only about a
> >> common-length building strut (a royal cubit, maybe?)
> >
Kirby:
> > Right, you're off on a tangent, like Zubek would be, wanting to
> > take "concentric hierarchy" in new directions perhaps -- and you're
> > free to, with whatever marketing. What I wouldn't intend, however,
> > is for Zubek to get any *exclusive* right to call his thing
> > "concentric hierarchy", as if now that he had some new meaning, we
> > had to relinquish our old one.
John:
> Yeah, makes good sense; enough confusion (too much, actually) exists around
> already. I got no need fer label-stealing nor bandwagon relabelling....
>
John:
> >> Kirby thinks it's a "cubist" desire (but I of course disagree: I can very
> >> make many non-cubistic items with equal-length sticks...) or that it
> >> doesn't matter, and to him (even maybe probably in general...), that's so.
> >
Kirby:
> > I'm just saying most standard textbook treatments, all by cubists,
> > do just what you say: make some edge length be the predominant
> > feature and calibrate all shapes to have exactly that edge. Your
> > idea is quite traditional.
John:
> I agree.
> I don't agree it's 'cubist' (implies prejudice; exclusionaries; elitism,
> etc.)
Kirby:
It's cubist in the sense that all these textbook treatments with some
fixed edge, will use a cube of that edge as their unit. You didn't
specify if that's what you'd do, but it's what they all do.
I'm not saying they're elitist in doing that. On the contrary, this
is what their grandfathers did, and they're just plying their trade.
The inertia of tradition is what's at work here, not snobbery.
And of course because of the edge fixation, they'll miss the whole
number ratios that reduce the intimidation factor enough to make
polyhedra a Montessori school topic, something suitable for Sesame
Street. A billion dollar industry of life supportive animations
(mathcasts) is just sitting there, raring to be fired up. Computer
graphics galore.
They won't use the tetrahedron as unit because it never occurs to
them to do so. After some thousands of years, Bucky Fuller comes
along and realizes there's a doorway here, into a whole new way of
thinking.
His thinking is a manifestation of the Zeitgeist in the sense that
a lot of thinkers are coming up with more 60-degree coordination in
their investigations. That's inherent in both sphere packing and
organic chemistry, where whole armies were working.
Alexander Graham Bell goes gaga for the octet truss.
That's a really interesting story but unimaginative Bucky detractors
just wanna use it to say "see, Bucky wasn't all that original, gets
patents for stuff others thought of".
That's to sidestep the whole issue of 60-degree (vs. 90-degree)
coordination in nature, which is something they *don't* want to talk
about (not explicitly), as that points back to the tetrahedron again,
which has become an annoyance if you're trying to command the loyalty
of your newest recruits to cubism -- some may be harboring doubts,
thanks to all that subversive stuff on the Internet.
In moving to the tetrahedron as a unit of volume and model of 3rd
powering, Fuller was distilling that trend to its essence, putting a
fine point on it, making it philosophically articulate and enduring.
In a parallel Universe, philosophers sit up and pay attention,
because here's one of those breakthroughs that only happens very
infrequently, like a super nova. The journals fill with commentary
and students pick up on the buzz. Lots of positive futurism
attaches: talk about world game, the global grid, mass-produced
shelter solutions, remotely deployed high tech communities, a design
science decade... all very exciting, and all linked to timeless
mathematical truths that would've made Neo-Platonists dance for joy.
Do you think Kepler would have turned his back on a volume 6 rhombic
dodecahedron, with inscribed cube and octahedron of volumes 3 and 4?
In our Universe, philosophers are jealously guarding an academic
turf centered around musty-dusty pencil logic, not even machine
executable (there's a snooty attitude to any logic the runs on a
machine, even though this is what Leibniz dreamed about). They
have Wittgenstein's Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics,
which opens the space for innovative language games like Fuller's
to easily slip in. But they mostly don't read that.
Philosophy is not into anything "big picture" these days and besides,
Dr. Fuller's many PhDs in the humanities were simply given to him.
All the more reason to keep his Synergetics completely unmentioned,
uncited. The ancient links between philosophy and polyhedra have all
been stigmatized as superstitious (very conveniently).
> Not all 'traditional' ideas are progress-killers, tho'; some just retain
> commonsensibility over time (do unto others; don' spit into a headwind;
> square wheels are stupid, etc.) (*g*)
>
Of course. I go out of my way to reassure cubists that their cubism
isn't under attack, just because it's not the only alternative. But
cubists are inherently insecure (because of their allegiance to an
unstable hexahedron?) and don't want any "alternatives" in the
picture, don't want to share the road. There's a kind of religious
orthodoxy in this attitude, a dogmatism. Cubists aren't used to
confronting this aspect of themselves, just as they're not used to
being called cubists.
John:
> >> I just like having a stack of identical sticks to build things with.
> >> Keeps the production line uncomplicated: no fractions, no conversion
> >> factors, etc.
> >> It also produces a common relationship between all things built with
> >> them;
> >> one can convert anything into anything else by starting with an edge, if
> >> all edges are identical.
> >
Kirby:
> > Sounds very workman-like and practical. It's not what we've got in
> > our zen garden (as a pre-frequency sculpture), but it's something
> > one might have instead. Here's another TV channel with its own
> > concentric hierarchy. Just punch the remote, and there ye be,
> > breaking bread with some other ethnicity (presuming you have bread
> > and break it).
>
John:
> Well, I've always been a Handyman. Workman-like has its place. (Fix the
> plumbing in the Zen Garden when it breaks down; keep the weeds down on the
> palace grounds; spay the bitch 'cause her pups are overrunning the place...
> ...practical things that those living in rarefied atmospheres don't wanna
> deal with, y'know?
Kirby:
I notice you swiped Zen Garden for yourself, and you're welcome to.
You've got that different sculpture. You're welcome to have both
in fact, if you'd like a virtual copy of ours (no degradation twixt
original and copy in the digital age).
We do have a volume 2. The five cubes in the pentagonal dodecahedron
inscribed in the rhombic tricontahedron of volume 5 each have that.
http://www.4dsolutions.net/ocn/koskigeom.html
John:
> >> But it's no biggie; just a preference; I'm not on any CH crusade....
> >> (*g*)
> >
Kirby:
> > Me neither. The TV channel with the rhombic dodecahedron of volume 6,
> > vis-a-vis the tetrahedron of volume 1 etc., is still accessible.
> > Sharing the dial with lots of cubists is just a fact of life as far
> > as I'm concerned. There's more of them than there are of us.
>
John:
> Always will be, unless your voice gets louder than theirs....
> Fact of life. (Same reason most of America hates science, turthful
> reasoning, and intelligence.)
>
Kirby:
I'm OK with our under-ground comic book culture, our SE Belmont with
Duke's, a headquarters for XO-based computing. I've been hoping to
get to some larger viewing audience through tele-media, but I'm not
sure what that will look like. I helped make Lindsey Walker famous
with that amateur Youtube video shot at Circadia (Burn Out), but
she's only tangentially into polyhedra in promoting Martian Math
through Laughing Horse, organizing a Free Skool event at Flipside.
However, I'm still hoping Portland, Oregon isn't the only subculture
where Synergetics is making lots of waves. I don't insist all our
sister cities be in North America, or that they be cities, or even
sisters, but I do hope they'll stay true to the music and not mess
up the channel with too many meanings of CH (Switzerland is OK, if
you're wanting to play nations).
Kirby
========================================
Source:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/synergeo/message/57826
==========================================
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| Topic: [Wittrs] More re Remarks on Foundations of Mathematics |
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| [Wittrs] More re Remarks on Foundations of Mathematics [message #3352] |
Sat, 30 January 2010 15:55 |
kirby urner
Messages: 213
Registered: August 2009
Location: Portland, Oregon |
Senior Member |
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Continuing with some threads that have interested me, and to
which I bring my understanding of Wittgenstein, here's a new
Wikipedia page:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quadray_coordinates
This is not new material, actually had an article published in
an old FoxPro Advisor, though I didn't cite that as this mag is
no longer in print I don't think, hard to find even on the web.
I should dig up the date though -- added assignment to inbox.
This was a collaborative effort, as I make clear in the docs (the
Wikipedia entry is deliberately short and sweet, almost more
literary than mathematical, like about some gizmo in Uru
(a computer game, by Cyan in Spokane, WA **).
Why this relates to Wittgenstein is it's clearly a little language
game that's easy enough to grasp, yet runs counter to so
many standard assumptions and therefore comes across as
disruptive, breaking gestalts. But to "break a gestalt" is, in a
more positive light, fighting the bewitchment of our intelligence
by means of language.
Going back to earlier posts, I've been discussing a model of
3rd powering based on the tetrahedron instead of the cube,
and a consistent way of evaluating the volumes of other shapes
based on this standard. There's a change in nomenclature,
some ripple effects, yet the underlying mathematics is
indifferent to these ripples in the sense that its seamless logic
is undisturbed. There's no broken glass at the end of the day.
We're free to go back to our other games and keep playing
them too, perhaps with some new perspective that'll even
help us play better?
I think that's what "philosophy leaves everything as it is"
sort of means. Wittgenstein is sometimes portrayed as an
iconoclast. I prefer to see him as a defender of ordinary
language that's doing work in the world, trying to keep it
from falling into various traps that may have ensnared some
philosopher types, rendering them fascinated and transfixed
by some deep grammatical problems. There's the therapy
aspect, but also preventive health. The PI supplies memetic
(mnemonic) antibodies at some level. One might suggest
students read it, web-publish about it, even if studying
some apparently unrelated science?
OK, back to my studies. Comments welcome as always
though I know this is arcane material. If you follow links to
Quadray Papers you might end up in my blog, something
about Quaker Geometry. Talk about esoteric!
Kirby
** http://cyanworlds.com/company/index.php
==========================================
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| Forum: Discussing Books, Articles or Papers |
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| Topic: Recollections of Wittgenstein |
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| Recollections of Wittgenstein [message #5483] |
Wed, 25 August 2010 00:53 |
RetroDeathRow
Messages: 70
Registered: January 2010
Location: Texas |
Member |
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http://www.amazon.com/Recollections-Wittgenstein-Hermine/dp/0192876287
I bought this book. It is a little pricy. I guess some LW books are a little pricy, but I tend to steer towards the cheaper ones- after all, there are so many LW books.
This one was a true gem; a pleasure; it is the best thing I have read about the man. Malcom, LW's sister, LW's Russian teacher, and MC Drury (a student), and someone else all contribute to this volume of memoirs. Of course, I don't much care for the Malcom's introduction; maybe because he is a philosopher. And the less structured and more elaborate 'Conversations' by Drury I thought trumped his analysis of LW's Lecture on Ethics and other writings. Still, they were all quite splendid. If I were to give a class on LW, I am not sure what books or manuscripts I would use by LW, but this would be the supplementary material.
He had a wonderful life.
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| Topic: [Wittrs] Fraser on Wittgenstein for the Guardian |
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| Topic: [Wittrs] Atlantic Monthly Article on the Wittgenstein Archives |
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| Topic: [Wittrs] [blog] On Why Part II of the Investigations is Re-Named in the Fourth Edition |
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| [Wittrs] [blog] On Why Part II of the Investigations is Re-Named in the Fourth Edition [message #2254] |
Wed, 11 November 2009 22:43 |
Squarespace Services
Messages: 14
Registered: October 2009 |
Junior Member |
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Sean Wilson <whoooo26505@yahoo.com> added On Why Part II of the Investigations is Re-Named in the Fourth Edition:
According to Norman Malcolm, Wittgenstein made the following remark (to Malcolm) in the late summer of 1949 regarding what has become known as Philosophical Investigations:
"... if he had the money, he thought he would have his book (TS 227, the typescript of the Investigations) mimeographed and distributed among his friends. He said that it was not in a completely finished state, but that he did not think that he could give the final polish to it in his lifetime. The plan would have the merit that he could put in parenthesis after a remark, expressions of dissatisfaction, like 'This is not quite right' or 'This is fishy'. He would like to put his book into the hands of his friends, but to take it to a publisher right now was out of the question."
After quoting that passage, Hacker and Schulte in the new (4th) edition go on to say:
"Whatever Wittgenstein's final intentions were, the fact is that the closest he ever came to completing the Philosophical Investigations is the current text consisting of ss 1-693. It is, we believe, this text that should be known as Witgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. What has hitherto been called 'Philosophical Investigations, Part II' was a re-arranged set of remarks written between 1946 and 1949 dealing chiefly with questions in what Wittgenstein called 'philosophy of psychology'. We have named it 'Philosophy of Psychology -- A Fragment.' This is, in effect, a reconstruction of ... typescript 234, based on MS 144 and the printed version in the previous editions of the Investigations."
Sources. Hacker and Schulte, p. xxii-xxiii (revised 4th edition of PI), and Malcolm, Ludwig Wittgenstein -- A Memoir, 2nd Ed., p. 75. Regards.
Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq.
< http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrs-blog/2009/11/11/on-why-part-ii-of-the-inv estigations-is-re-named-in-the-four.html>
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| Topic: [Wittrs] [blog] Vetting the New Translations of Philosophical Investigations |
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| Forum: Reservoir and Strands |
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| Topic: [Wittrs] Post linguistic-turn: philosophies as "glue languages" |
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| [Wittrs] Post linguistic-turn: philosophies as "glue languages" [message #5471] |
Mon, 23 August 2010 19:51 |
kirby urner
Messages: 213
Registered: August 2009
Location: Portland, Oregon |
Senior Member |
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|
In recent essays regarding how we've countered the knowledge explosion, in ways other than by simply narrowing our respective knowledge domains, I've come to a notion of Philosophy (as a discipline) as an incubator for glue languages.
A "glue language" is one that is deliberately designed to cohere multiple other disciplines. I would claim this is (a) not a new vision of what philosophy does and (b) is akin to some types of poetics, which stands to reason as metered oral tradition ragas & sagas were indeed a way for cultures to encode and transmit vital knowledge.
Another thesis, non-Wittgensteinian in the sense of arguable (debatable, either way), is that the recent chapter in philosophy (pre linguistic turn) namely the rise of analytic philosophy in the form of symbolic logic as a "mirror of the world" (Tractatus idea), was about the noosphere (zeitgeist, holy ghost) giving birth to computer languages, as dreamed of by Leibniz, Ada, Grace Hopper... a different lineage than those analytics like to own, but arguably more the main line, with the benefit of hindsight (a view of history).
Logic matured into that which runs most of our infrastructure by this time, at low level record-keeping level, and even at the real time control level, where humans tend to spontaneously operate. Philosophy again appears in the driver's seat (as it might have been seen in trivium-quadrivium days) once we allow it to give birth to computer science as one of its own (as Athena from Zeus)
However, this computer logic is low level and largely content free. It gives us ways to store and retrieve, but is not spontaneously integrative except insofar as it allows us to sift through, synthesize and summarize super-human amounts of data (more than any one researcher could hope to personally collect and analyze).
The next level or challenge, is to develop more glue languages, designed as tools for human thought, that help us navigate these wilds, this new "cyberspace" ("steering place"), i.e. this new governing area (not to be confused with Area 51).
Wittgenstein's later philosophy opens doors to glue languages by leveling the playing field, providing a clean beginning. How could many languages be true at the same time? Isn't that just relativism? SWM and I used to debate this on wittgenstein-dialognet.
In focusing on the "doing" in symbolic games, rather than their "pointing" to some supposed "public object" or one true "in itself world", he turned language inside-out, made it seem more like what we see in the case of computer languages: a kind of executing or processing of energy, a vectoring content this way and that. A strong religion is like an efficient FORTRAN program, in keeping memory working hard for the greater glory. A different ideology or religion would operate differently, yet still get work done. The "forms of life" approach allows for different reference frames that all share the same "c" ("c" for "certainty").
Lots of computer languages do the work, not just one, and we see no contradiction. We see "forms of life" connecting to "grammars".
A human glue language provides inertial guidance, a kind of homing device, a gyroscope, except this "glue language" is not monolithic or "the one true system" ala Hegel or the Tower of Babel -- both closer to the logical core / divine order than your average joe and/or structure, but neither the "last word" as the world keeps changing, which in turn requires upgrades (sometimes in answer to our prayers).
We're ethically precluded from calling "it" (our glue language) "finally done" and/or "instantly true" (as if "the truth" could be captured in a snap shot per the old "picture theory" of meaning) i.e. living systems are about becoming, adapting, not about "the end of history". One comes to see in a new way.
My final thesis will be that this Bucky Fuller gestated glue language called "synergetics" (not to be confused with its fraternal twin -- see Wikipedia for disambiguation) is one such post linguistic-turn philosophy. Its purpose is less to "corner truth" than to "orient and contain an outlook and overview" i.e. to organize a vista around some "me ball" (the observer). This is a legitimate service for a philosophy to perform and is what many a philosopher has sought to provide.
Synergetics explicitly glues polyhedra, long a source of fascination and insights for natural philosophers, to a "connect the dots" model of "thinking in the round" (i.e. systematically). A lot of "hard science" content is linked in by this model and glued together using a prose-poetic style. Jungian psychology would be another example of a prose-poetic style, another glue language.
A lot of geometry enters in as well.
In Synergetics, one gets a kind of "mnemonic brew" that might be considered toxic or corrosive if branded as a pure science (see the preface by Dr. Arthur Loeb), but refiled as a literary philosophy, this potion turns out to be benign, safe to swallow (or so I would report -- though other might say it has rendered me alien).
Kirby
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| Topic: Lost Message Replying to Stuart by Jon. |
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| Lost Message Replying to Stuart by Jon. [message #5314] |
Tue, 27 July 2010 21:37 |
SWMirsky
Messages: 1236
Registered: August 2009 |
Senior Member |
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--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, Sean Wilson <whoooo26505@...> wrote:
>
> [this did not get forwarded from the message board. Trying to work out those
> bugs -- sw.]
>
I'm prepared to respond on this list but not to participate at some remove from another where I don't see everything that is going on. Moreover, I don't really know what to make of Jon's remarks below. That is, I cannot follow much of what is being said but will try here and there to respond.
> I am not. I am not familiar with the picture theory of meaning in the TLP, SWM!
?
> All I ever hear about the TLP is the picture theory of meaning. But then I read
> something like this:
>
> http://philosophyktl.blogspot.com/2010/01/what-wittgensteins-picture-theory-is.html
>
>
> And all I can do is appear confused.
>
Okay.
> 3 The logical picture of the facts is the thought.
>
> Is this the so-called 'picture theory of meaning'? Or do we need to add:
>
> 4 The thought is the significant proposition.
>
> Is this when I am supposed to say, "Now I understand the picture theory!"
> because LW said some thought was significant?
>
?
> I think we need prop 5 to make sense of what a proposition is. It is a
> truth-function. But significant ones are truth-functions of a logical picture of
> facts. Surely LW doesn't describe a picture. He gives a picture. Or am I
> mistaken?
>
Again, I am not following.
> Well, what does SWM think? Does LW give us a picture, or does he simply talk
> about pictures?
>
Both. Though I think he means something different by pictures in the late work than he did in the earlier.
> And if he does give a picture, what is it? 5.101 or the very book numbered to 7,
> or something else? The general form of proposition, maybe?
>
> Well, Walto quotes some person saying "Propositions are pictures", and maybe
> that is a line from the TLP but I cannot cite it. But I guess that settles it.
> 5.101 is not the picture LW gives us, even if it is a picture. The general form,
> also, is not the picture. What can it be other than the propositions numbered to
> 7? He did say, after all, that his work would be useless without the numbering
> system.
>
> 4.016
> In order to understand the essence of the proposition, consider hieroglyphic
> writing, which pictures the facts it describes.
>
> And from it came the alphabet without the essence of the representation being
> lost.
>
> But hieroglyphic writing is in the word or letter. Wittgenstein is not making a
> shift in words, but propositions. A shift in grammar/language?
>
In his later work he drops the discussion of propositions in favor of the actual sentences, the statements we use.
> SWM thinks you can say different things and mean the same thing, and then cites
> some mythical version of LW that agrees with him.
I think it's quite clear that we can make the same point in different ways. We do it all the time and we certainly do it when speaking different languages. If we didn't, we could never understand one another at all. You don't need to cite Wittgenstein to see that.
> All I see in the PI are
> notions that you cannot say different things and mean the same thing.
I think you are missing something then. Wittgenstein nowhere denies synonyms or variant locutions for expressing the same point.
> As for
> saying the same thing and meaning different things, what could possibly be said
> on the matter? Maybe something about hieroglyphics?
>
?
> Aside from claims, like, "Isn't it obvious?" and other bull. All the comparisons
> he draws are of different writing systems and how they look different (woopee!).
The point there had to do with variant modes of notation, not with language per se.
> He doesn't hit upon any shift of grammar though.
>
?
> Some book says "Temptation is that which should not be succumbed to" and SWM
> will say "Look, there; the word 'should'! This is an ought claim!"
No, SWM would see no reason to say that!
...And I
> might say, "It looks like the definition of a word to me. No different than 'All
> bachelors are unmarried men'". Now that would be a difference in grammar or
> language or something, right?
Which?
> Saying a Chinese sentence is Chinese probably
> wasn't the insight the Wittgenstein was after (in any part of his life), that
> is, if recognize that LW was not suffering from autism. Oh, the 'critics'!
>
> Jon
>
This is mostly opaque to me I'm afraid. Perhaps it is just my own deficiency.
SWM
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| Topic: [Wittrs] wrong author's name |
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| [Wittrs] wrong author's name [message #2658] |
Thu, 10 December 2009 14:49 |
CJ
Messages: 38
Registered: September 2009 |
Member |
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Sorry, but Obama must be infecting my mind, the name of the author is Auyang.....Foundations of Complex Systems...here's a blurb from a Amazon on the boo
Complex behavior can occur in any system made up of large numbers of interacting constituents, be they atoms in a solid, cells in a living organism, or consumers in a national economy. Analysis of this behavior often involves making important assumptions and approximations, the exact nature of which vary from subject to subject. Foundations of Complex-system Theories begins with a description of the general features of complexity and then examines a range of important concepts, such as theories of composite systems, collective phenomena, emergent properties, and stochastic processes. Each topic is discussed with reference to the fields of statistical physics, evolutionary biology, and economics, thereby highlighting recurrent themes in the study of complex systems. This detailed yet nontechnical book will appeal to anyone who wants to know more about complex systems and their behavior. It will also be of great interest to specialists studying complexity in the physical, biological, and social sciences.
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| Forum: On Wittgenstein Himself |
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| Topic: [Wittrs] Wittgenstein's Family |
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| Topic: [Wittrs] Why Wittgenstein Makes You More Sophisticated |
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| [Wittrs] Why Wittgenstein Makes You More Sophisticated [message #1304] |
Fri, 25 September 2009 21:03 |
Sean Wilson
Messages: 470
Registered: August 2009 |
Senior Member |
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(here is what is on the new page)
When I founded this group, it was because I had come to learn something quite revealing about discussion fora. Over and over again, certain rituals occur. One is that a person will bring out a dictionary and quote a definition in an effort to tell another person what he or she had just said. Or they will argue as though a word is a picture in the world or as though it must have a fixed set of properties. Still others will be unable to navigate a person's lexicon -- unable, as it were, to "conjugate" grammar.
To understand Wittgenstein, one must have two basic abilities: extreme patience with the delivery of the "medicine," and an especially-refined ability to synthesize and relate ideas. This is as much of a cognitive aptitude as is excelling in mathematics or having a strong memory. As a professor, I have seen students who can absorb and transform ideas as though their minds were specifically built for this sort of cognition. Unfortunately, they are the minority. More often, students have minds that want to store something in memory and simply report it. Struggling to read Wittgenstein (and becoming successful at it) can have an effect on the mind similar to what going to the gym has upon the body. One’s capacity to navigate an idea or an assertion becomes significantly pronounced. It's almost like the very act of intelligence is now seen as something different.
In this sense, people who properly understand Wittgenstein have proven themselves more insightful in certain respects, just by virtue of Wittgenstein's ideas being so remarkable. But they also gain something else directly relevant to discourse. They obtain what might be called "Ludwig's technique." In many ways, Wittgenstein offered us no great theory or prescription -- he offered, instead, a new kind of craft. It is almost like he found a new way home for people who had for years been walking the long way around. And that craft is the ability to navigate grammar and conjugate expressions so that apparent problems dissolve themselves. Black-belt Wittgensteinians do not engage in the ordinary rituals of "debate." Instead, they "untie knots." They show where traffic accidents arise in language. The result is not truth, but peace -- therapy rather than argumentation.
Not all who appreciate Wittgenstein can do this equally. I liken the Wittgenstein-inspired to a karate school. Some are black-belt Wittgensteinians, some are still in training. But in either case, discussion is much better served than if one had no appreciation at all for what a language game is, what grammar is (and so forth). And what is interesting about this realization is that IT IS NOT LIMITED TO PHILOSOPHY. Indeed, every discipline would benefit from having a Wittgensteinian in the department. There is no field which is immune from Ludwig's insights and techniques.
And so, here we are: the Wittgenstein-learned and appreciative. Our goal is to simply have insightful discussion. The topic can be anything intellectual (research ideas, recent books). It can be about Wittgenstein or not. Hopefully, if enough Wittgenstein-inspired scholars and thinkers join, it will be very special indeed.
Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq.
Assistant Professor
Wright State University
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| Forum: Analytic Philosophers Discussing the Tractatus |
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| Topic: [Wittrs] Comments on last points of theTractatus |
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| [Wittrs] Comments on last points of theTractatus [message #5448] |
Wed, 18 August 2010 18:31 |
gabuddabout
Messages: 243
Registered: December 2009 |
Senior Member |
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Message #129 of 136 < Prev | Next >
Re: The Conclusion of the Tractatus
It's interesting that you mention Schopenhauer. Until I read the Richter study guide to the Tractatus, I had no idea how much of an influence he was on W. Particularly "The Fourfold Root" apparently.
W
--- In quickphilosophy@yahoogroups.com, "gabuddabout" <gabuddabout@...> wrote: >
>
>
> --- In quickphilosophy@yahoogroups.com, "walto" <calhorn@> wrote: > >
> > 6.41
> >
> > The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as it is and happens as it does happen. In it there is no valueand if there were, it would be of no value.
>
>
> This just seems false to me for the following simple reason: >
> All fictions (like anything spoken of that is not in the world) have a sense because any fiction spoken of, by that token, has a sense from the author of the fiction, no?
>
> >
> > If there is a value which is of value, it must lie outside all happening and being-so. For all happening and being-so is accidental. >
>
> This sounds like patent nonsense. If I value a good treatise on how rhythmic ear training can be represented at every step by written notation, it follows (by abduction) that the value is mine, I'm in the world. >
> OTOH, what is the point of deliberately writing (or defining that which is not entirely about blind brute physics as nonsense) nonsense and calling it such at the end of a so-called book _of_ philosophy? I conclude that a book _of_ philosophy with the upshot that philosophy has subject matter that makes no sense and is defined (arbitrarily) as having no connection to science, is simply bad philosophy (by arbitrary?) definition.
>
>
>
> >
> > What makes it non-accidental cannot lie in the world, for otherwise this would again be accidental.
> >
> > It must lie outside the world.
>
> I'm a causal realizer of a mambo groove I wrote and tweaked today for a student. I needed nonaccidental causality to get it done and it couldn't have gotten done just accidentally, though I feel I could have realized other grooves as well, and as I did. And all that happened in the world as far as I'm aware. >
> How does Wittgenstein get away with this sort of thing? Well, one can get a taste for it by reading Schopenhauer's _The World as Will and Representation, Vol.2, "On Man's Need for Metaphysics." Just as some of the flavor of Schop's fourfold root of the principle of suff. reason is the reason why Witters picks up on calling value-assertions senseless, Schop. doesn't think that ethical statements, er, considerations are to be eliminated or reduced to a place where they aren't.
>
> I consider Schop. one of the first nonreductive materialists (though complaining that materialism proper just forgets to think there can be an (scientific) account of subjectivity) who took consciousness seriously and allowed that there probably is no arguing against the idea that such may be given a causal account. Note that what Schop. regards as grades of objectification of the will (natural forces combining into systems that are both conscious and capable of being moved by art being at the highest grade) are distinct grades even though all grades reduce to natural forces. Causal reducibility without ontological reduction as Seare has it. Middle sized objects (brains and concepts) as allowing for distinct sciences that have a vocabulary that cross-classifies without introducing anything not there, maintaining that, contra some concept pragmatists, there are bona fide mental events without there being an a priori argument available which suggests such a view to be saddled with what Kim calls causal overdetermination (Something like Fodor's view if I have him right).
> >
> > 6.42
> >
> > Hence also there can be no ethical propositions. > >
> > Propositions cannot express anything higher.
>
>
> Well, one can define propositions that way I suppose. What is the upshot, though? Now it's 6.42 and, later, that 6.42 is nonsense. But surely this is an important (ethically speaking?) art that Witters concocted because the upshot is not to do philosophy a certain way. Perhaps he shows this by writing a book that is both good and good insofar as it shows that it can only show the ethical upshot without talking about it? Somehow it seems better books are possible, as it seemed later to Witters.
>
>
>
> >
> > 6.421
> >
> > It is clear that ethics cannot be expressed.
> >
> > Ethics is transcendental.
> >
> > (Ethics and æsthetics are one.)
>
>
> I think my student had better practice that mambo along with transitioning to the punk groove I also wrote in order to hack something new and cool to play. Or is Witters saying that ethical statements that are in a more general form ought not to be thought as expressible given some definitions of expressibility for (four-fold root?) reasons?
>
>
>
> >
> > 6.422
> >
> >
> > The first thought in setting up an ethical law of the form "thou shalt . . ." is: And what if I do not do it? But it is clear that ethics has nothing to do with punishment and reward in the ordinary sense. This question as to the consequences of an action must therefore be irrelevant. At least these consequences will not be events.
>
>
> Is it not _possible events_ as consequences that are implied by following or not following a rule? Thou shalt count in order to tell me where that particular eighth note right there (pointing) is in 4/4 time. So the student points at the note without saying anything. Then I remind about the type of answer required. But I now see that I probably missed the point about "ethical law"--Witters might have read Nietzsche complaining about how unfair it would be to allow our not following ethical laws while disallowing God not to follow some too on a whim. I allow that I still may have missed the point. Perhaps Witters is critiquing the idea of an abstract consequence as the "material" from which an ethical proposition gets its content?
>
>
>
> > For there must be something right in that
> > formulation of the question. There must be some sort of ethical reward and ethical punishment, but this must lie in the action itself. > >
> > (And this is clear also that the reward must be something acceptable, and the punishment something unacceptable.)
> >
> > 6.423
> >
> > Of the will as the subject of the ethical we cannot speak. >
> Is this taken as a fact now, and later (at 7) not a fact? > How about the will as the subject of some natural force systems with the gift of gab and bossiness?
>
> >
> > And the will as a phenomenon is only of interest to psychology. >
> Here Witters seems to be using will in a more restricted sense than Schop. does (everthing is will--though that may seem senseless as Walter pointed out about generalities of such kinds as use the whole world as subject of a proposition). But Witters seems to allow here what Fodor might think a concession to the view that philosophy has to be a bit about science, psychology being an important one due to all the concepts running around in philosophy books.
>
> >
> > 6.43
> >
> > If good or bad willing changes the world, it can only change the limits of the world, not the facts; not the things that can be expressed in language. >
>
> This will soon look like nonsense if it doesn't already.. >
> >
> > In brief, the world must thereby become quite another, it must so to speak wax or wane as a whole.
>
>
> As a whole--neat! Wax or wane where as a whole? And so on. >
> >
> > The world of the happy is quite another than that of the unhappy. >
>
> It is pointless to parade truisms as philosophy only later to point out that the truisms are nonsensical.
>
> >
> > 6.431
> >
> > As in death, too, the world does not change, but ceases. >
>
> As a whole for that person who doesn't know that it ceases? Or did the world cease after the death of Adam? I'm just making fun now. And what about possible eternal occurrence of possible worlds in both series and parallel (somehow and don't ask!) such that each of them get played over and over like a record? Note that this doesn't imply that each possible world doesn't contain potential realizers of causes in the form (of persons) that we have today (Hey mambo! Mambo Italiano!)
>
>
> >
> > 6.4311
> >
> > Death is not an event of life. Death is not lived through. >
>
> Yes it is; furthermore, since it is not lived through, death can't constitute cessation of the world, including mine as far as I can tell. >
>
> >
> > If by eternity is understood not endless temporal duration but timelessness, then he lives eternally who lives in the present.
>
>
> That holds (or seems to possibly) even if by eternity is understood endless temporal duration. How thin of a present?
>
> >
> > Our life is endless in the way that our visual field is without limit. >
> Witters on acid! I can see for miles and miles and Miles Davis plays on endlessly in the eternal music of playfulness that is so innocent it forgot to stop playing, ever, according to Nietzsche's view of the most scientific possible hypothesis--.
> >
> > 6.4312
> >
> > The temporal immortality of the human soul, that is to say, its eternal survival after death, is not only in no way guaranteed, but this assumption in the first place will not do for us what we always tried to make it do. Is a riddle solved by the fact that I survive for ever? Is this eternal life not as enigmatic as our present one? The solution of the riddle of life in space and time lies outside space and time.
>
> Pure Schopenhauer--except that space and time as we conceive them (phenomenon), for Schop., are not real in the way will in itself "is," and that only possibly (hence the scare quotes), what with Schop. going on and on in his "Epiphilosophy" chapter at the end of the 2nd vol. of WWR as concerns our inability to speak of it (will in itself) because all our understanding is equipped to deal with are things/events that fall under the fourfold root of the PSR. So Schop. is a realist (just like Witters seems to be in the Tractatus) about truths that are not speakable in the way ordinary and scientific truths are.
>
> >
> > (It is not problems of natural science which have to be solved.) >
> Note that this squares with Schop.'s "On Man's Need.." (vol.2) where Schop. makes the point that the most complete science would be the most proper statement of the problem of metaphysics.
> >
> > 6.432
> >
> > How the world is, is completely indifferent for what is higher. God does not reveal himself in the world.
> >
> > 6.4321
> >
> > The facts all belong only to the task and not to its performance. >
> All of 'em?
> >
> > 6.44
> >
> > Not how the world is, is the mystical, but that it is. >
>
> Seems consistent with Schop's "On Man's Need.."
>
> >
> > 6.45
> >
> > The contemplation of the world sub specie aeterni is its contemplation as a limited whole.
> >
> > The feeling that the world is a limited whole is the mystical feeling. >
> But a limited whole that endures without limit ought to be just as mystical because just as, later, senseless.
> >
> > 6.5
> >
> > For an answer which cannot be expressed the question too cannot be expressed.
>
> We can do a thought experiment like Witters is now doing such that we say that the most complete science just _is_ the proper statement of the riddle. > >
> > The riddle does not exist.
>
> Or not!
>
> >
> > If a question can be put at all, then it can also be answered. >
> Call to all constructionists, Searle and Fodor fans, hell, even probably the human population if everybody must think this way--assuming thinking this way is not nonsense, as it later is called.
> >
> > 6.51
> >
> > Scepticism is not irrefutable, but palpably senseless, if it would doubt where a question cannot be asked.
>
> But the sceptics can just ask about justification for any claim, including the above. Either regress or circularity threatens (including the circularity of Schopenhaurian fallibilism as expressed unequivocally in "On Man's Need.."--perceptions justify perceptions, all of which are empirical and not a priori).
>
> >
> > For doubt can only exist where there is a question; a question only where there is an answer, and this only where something can be said. >
> How many times has the world in its entire range of possible worlds repeated itself from any unique slice of its duration in x dimensions? > Perhaps there is no answer to this question, though it seems meaningful even if we can give an a priori reason (ex hypothesi) why it is a question that can't be answered. Maybe I just got way too mystical for my own good--I liked the ambiguity here!
> >
> > 6.52
> >
> > We feel that even if all possible scientific questions be answered, the problems of life have still not been touched at all. Of course there is then no question left, and just this is the answer.
>
> This is an awesome piece of Witters pie; I think it tastes just right. >
> >
> > 6.521
> >
> > The solution of the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of this problem.
> >
> > (Is not this the reason why men to whom after long doubting the sense of life became clear, could not then say wherein this sense consisted?) >
> Fair enough I guess. So far at least!
>
> >
> > 6.522
> >
> > There is indeed the inexpressible. This shows itself; it is the mystical. > >
> > 6.53
> >
> > The right method of philosophy would be this: To say nothing except what can be said, i.e. the propositions of natural science, i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy: and then always, when someone else wished to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had given no meaning to certain signs in his propositions. This method would be unsatisfying to the > > otherhe would not have the feeling that we were teaching him > > philosophybut it would be the only strictly correct method. >
>
> I'm afraid that giving a meaning to certain signs hasn't been given a sense. Senses, they say, are sometimes given to things after the gates close to the public at Oxford, but Fodor suggests this to be a leg pull. > >
> > 6.54
> >
> > My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.)
> >
> > He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly. > >
> > 7
> >
> >
> > Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent. >
>
> On the cover of Jonathan Dancy's _Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology_: >
> AVT TACE,
> AVT LOQVERE MELIORA
> SILENTIO
>
> Probably would have done better not write these gazillion responses, but who can say really I would have been doing anything better if not? >
> Cheers,
> Budd
>
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| Topic: [Wittrs] [quickphilosophy] Ostrow Sums Up the Tractatus |
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| [Wittrs] [quickphilosophy] Ostrow Sums Up the Tractatus [message #5432] |
Mon, 16 August 2010 10:11 |
walterhorn
Messages: 3
Registered: August 2010 |
Junior Member |
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From Matthew Ostrow's helpful Wittgenstein's Tractatus: A Dialectical Interpretation.
What W considers as characteristic of the philosophical approach
is just its tendency to misinterpret that feeling of disquiet, to misconstrue what is appropriate as a response. Our unease in the world crystallizes into unresolvable philosophical perplexity.
This whole issue can be seen to underlie the following important remarks:
At the basis of the whole modern view of the world lies the illusion that the so-called laws of nature are the explanations of natural phenomena. (6.371)
So people stop short at natural laws as at something unassailable, as did the ancients at God and Fate.
And they both are right and wrong. But the ancients were clearer, in so far as they recognized one clear terminus, whereas the modern system makes it appear as though everything were explained (6.372)
W claims that at the basis of the modern view is a "illusion." He is not suggesting, then, that the pursuit of philosophy is to be replaced by a kind of scientism, a belief that the deepest yearnings of human beings can finally be met in the context of scientific progress. But neither are we to turn to nonscientific modes of explanation. The ancients are here commended not for having a superior explanatory system, but for recognizing, in the worlds of the later W, that explanations come to an end somewhere: rather than serving as the basis of an ultimate "super account," the appeal to God or fate is, for the Tractatus, an acknowledgement that there is a point at which nothing more can be said
.
Over and over, the text attempts to expose the different guises of philosophical disquietude: as the demand that the picture's fundamental relation to the world be once and for all secured, as the need for a theory of types to prevent nonsense, as the attempt to set down a formal specification of the laws of thought. And over and over we are to see in response how, in the words of 5.473, logic must take care of itself. We are to see, that is, how there is after all nothing for us to do to satisfy these kinds of concerns, how it is the concerns themselves that are the source of our fundamental unease. In gaining clarity about our philosophical confusions we can then be said to be liberated from the problem of life, the sense that our fundamental relationship to the whe world is something that requires a straightforward solution. Thus W intersperses remarks about the disappearance of philosophical problems with claims about the appropriate way of living in general:
The solution of the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of the problem. (Is this the reason why those who have found after a long period of doubt that the sense of life became clear to them have then been unable to say what constituted that sense?) (6.521) If, for the Tractatus, philosophy comes to stand for our fundamental estrangement from the world, it is then in the disappearance of philosophy that our redemption lies.
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| Topic: [Wittrs] [quickphilosophy] The Conclusion of the Tractatus |
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| [Wittrs] [quickphilosophy] The Conclusion of the Tractatus [message #5429] |
Sun, 15 August 2010 21:13 |
walto
Messages: 64
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6.41
The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as it is and happens as it does happen. In it there is no value​and if there were, it would be of no value.
If there is a value which is of value, it must lie outside all happening and being-so. For all happening and being-so is accidental.
What makes it non-accidental cannot lie in the world, for otherwise this would again be accidental.
It must lie outside the world.
6.42
Hence also there can be no ethical propositions.
Propositions cannot express anything higher.
6.421
It is clear that ethics cannot be expressed.
Ethics is transcendental.
(Ethics and æsthetics are one.)
6.422
The first thought in setting up an ethical law of the form "thou shalt . . ." is: And what if I do not do it? But it is clear that ethics has nothing to do with punishment and reward in the ordinary sense. This question as to the consequences of an action must therefore be irrelevant. At least these consequences will not be events. For there must be something right in that formulation of the question. There must be some sort of ethical reward and ethical punishment, but this must lie in the action itself.
(And this is clear also that the reward must be something acceptable, and the punishment something unacceptable.)
6.423
Of the will as the subject of the ethical we cannot speak.
And the will as a phenomenon is only of interest to psychology.
6.43
If good or bad willing changes the world, it can only change the limits of the world, not the facts; not the things that can be expressed in language.
In brief, the world must thereby become quite another, it must so to speak wax or wane as a whole.
The world of the happy is quite another than that of the unhappy.
6.431
As in death, too, the world does not change, but ceases.
6.4311
Death is not an event of life. Death is not lived through.
If by eternity is understood not endless temporal duration but timelessness, then he lives eternally who lives in the present.
Our life is endless in the way that our visual field is without limit.
6.4312
The temporal immortality of the human soul, that is to say, its eternal survival after death, is not only in no way guaranteed, but this assumption in the first place will not do for us what we always tried to make it do. Is a riddle solved by the fact that I survive for ever? Is this eternal life not as enigmatic as our present one? The solution of the riddle of life in space and time lies outside space and time.
(It is not problems of natural science which have to be solved.)
6.432
How the world is, is completely indifferent for what is higher. God does not reveal himself in the world.
6.4321
The facts all belong only to the task and not to its performance.
6.44
Not how the world is, is the mystical, but that it is.
6.45
The contemplation of the world sub specie aeterni is its contemplation as a limited whole.
The feeling that the world is a limited whole is the mystical feeling.
6.5
For an answer which cannot be expressed the question too cannot be expressed.
The riddle does not exist.
If a question can be put at all, then it can also be answered.
6.51
Scepticism is not irrefutable, but palpably senseless, if it would doubt where a question cannot be asked.
For doubt can only exist where there is a question; a question only where there is an answer, and this only where something can be said.
6.52
We feel that even if all possible scientific questions be answered, the problems of life have still not been touched at all. Of course there is then no question left, and just this is the answer.
6.521
The solution of the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of this problem.
(Is not this the reason why men to whom after long doubting the sense of life became clear, could not then say wherein this sense consisted?)
6.522
There is indeed the inexpressible. This shows itself; it is the mystical.
6.53
The right method of philosophy would be this: To say nothing except what can be said, i.e. the propositions of natural science, i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy: and then always, when someone else wished to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had given no meaning to certain signs in his propositions. This method would be unsatisfying to the other​he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy​but it would be the only strictly correct method.
6.54
My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.)
He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly.
7
Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.
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| Topic: [Wittrs] Re: The World According to Wittgenstein I and Wittgenstein II |
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| [Wittrs] Re: The World According to Wittgenstein I and Wittgenstein II [message #5341] |
Sun, 01 August 2010 08:45 |
walto
Messages: 64
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Hi Sean.
Just thought I'd mention that the post below was not actually written by any "BruceD". It was lifted, without citation, from a review by Dennis Patterson of Rutgers University that appeared in 'Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews' in 2003."
Way too much of that sort of thing, IMHO.
W
--- In WittrsC@yahoogroups.com, "BruceD" <wittrsamr@...> wrote: >
>
> --- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "gabuddabout" <wittrsamr@> wrote: >
> > Hacker thinks that both involve a mereological fallacy. And what is > such a thing.
>
> In Chapter 3 of Part I - "The Mereological Fallacy in Neuroscience" - > Bennett and Hacker set out a critical framework that is the pivot of > the book. They argue that for some neuroscientists, the brain does all > manner of things: it believes (Crick); interprets (Edelman); knows > (Blakemore); poses questions to itself (Young); makes decisions > (Damasio); contains symbols (Gregory) and represents information > (Marr). Implicit in these assertions is a philosophical mistake, > insofar as it unreasonably inflates the conception of the 'brain' by > assigning to it powers and activities that are normally reserved for > sentient beings. It is the degree to which these assertions depart > from the norms of linguistic practice that sends up a red flag. The > reason for objection is this: it is one thing to suggest on empirical > grounds correlations between a subjective, complex whole (say, the > activity of deciding and some particular physical part of that > capacity, say, neural firings) but there is considerable objection to > concluding that the part just is the whole. These claims are not > false; rather, they are devoid of sense.
>
> Wittgenstein remarked that it is only of a human being that it makes > sense to say "it has sensations; it sees, is blind; hears, is deaf; is > conscious or unconscious." (Philosophical Investigations, § 281). The > question whether brains think "is a philosophical question, not a > scientific one" (p. 71). To attribute such capacities to brains is to > commit what Bennett and Hacker identify as "the mereological fallacy", > that is, the fallacy of attributing to parts of an animal attributes > that are properties of the whole being. Moreover, merely replacing the > mind by the brain leaves intact the misguided Cartesian conception of > the relationship between the mind and behavior, merely replacing the > ethereal by grey glutinous matter. The structure of the Cartesian > explanatory system remains intact, and this leads to Bennett and > Hacker's conclusion that contemporary cognitive neuroscientists are > not nearly anti-Cartesian enough. Much more of the Cartesian > conceptual scheme needs to be rejected.
>
> Philosophers of mind are themselves prone to similar conceptual > errors. Consider John Searle on pain and the role of the brain: >
> 'Common sense tells us that our pains are located in physical > space within our bodies, that for example, a pain in the foot is > literally inside the area of the foot. But we now know that is false. > The brain forms a body image and pains, like all bodily sensations, > are part of the body image. The pain-in-the-foot is literally in the > physical space of the brain. '(Searle, J., The Rediscovery of the > Mind, MIT Press, 1992: p. 63.)
>
> Bennett and Hacker object on grounds of logical grammar: one does not > have pains "in the brain." Pains (other than headaches) are not "in > the head." If there is a locus of pain it is a distributed feature of > the whole experience, the brain being only one physical part of it. > For the experiencing subject, of course, "His pain is located where he > sincerely suggests it is" (p.123) (phantom pains being in need of > special explanation). This is not to deny that in the absence of a > proper functioning brain, one would feel no pains. But that does not > license the claim that pains "are felt either in or by the brain" (p. > 122). What hurts when one breaks one's leg is typically one's leg, not > one's head.
>
> Part III ("Consciousness and Contemporary Neuroscience: An Analysis") > considers the leading work on consciousness as well as neuroscientific > efforts to explain the "mystery" of consciousness. McGinn, Dennett, > Searle, Chalmers and Nagel are just a few of the many philosophers > whose arguments Bennett and Hacker scrutinize with care. > Neuroscientists such as Blakemore, Crick, Damasio, Edelman, as well as > psychologists such as Baars and Weiskrantz, are given equal treatment, > especially their attempts to make the case that the brain is a > conscious organ. Absent the brain, of course, there is no > consciousness, but ascribing consciousness as such solely to the brain > is philosophically suspect.
>
> When it comes to consciousness, no topic will invite more discord than > that of qualia. When Nagel asks "What is it like to be a bat?," > Bennett and Hacker answer that the question proceeds from a > philosophical confusion. Qualia - the idea that mental states have > qualitative characteristics - is but another example of philosophers > bewitched by a philosophical pseudoproblem.
>
> These are some of the ideas that Bennett and Hacker are eager to > refute:
>
> There is a specific way it feels to hear, smell or "to have mental > states" (Block);.
>
> Every conscious state has a certain qualitative feel (Searle); >
> Each differentiable conscious experience presents a different > quale (Edelman and Tononi) (p. 274).
>
> Suppose, we ask a person who has had his sight or hearing restored > "How does it feel to see (or hear)?" They are likely to answer "Why, > it's wonderful." What we are asking after is the person's attitude > toward his recovery of a faculty, now restored. But what if we ask a > person possessed of normal faculties "What is it like to see a chair > or a table?" Bennett and Hacker aver that the person would have no > idea what we were talking about. Seeing tables and chairs, postboxes > and lampposts are all different experiences. But "[t]he experiences > differ only in so far as their objects differ" (p. 274). >
> Some neuroscientists have themselves fallen victim to the logical > fallacies of philosophers of consciousness. Damasio, for example, > explains vision as the production of mental images in the brain. > Bennett and Hacker object that this explanatory model makes no sense, > since it raises objections of another kind; the hypothesis that mental > images are real features instantiated in the brain would not seem > subject to empirical verification and, even if it were, it would fail > to illuminate vision as we know it. Of course, there is brain activity > associated with vision. But it is unhelpful and of little value to say > that "we" perceive the image of the apple produced in our brain. The > question Bennett and Hacker ask, "How is it that we see it?" (p. 305) > cannot receive philosophical illumination by the question "Where 'in' > the brain is the image?" The reason is that that question ignores the > all-important one: "Who, or what, is doing the seeing?" The error is > in thinking that seeing an object is itself somehow reducible to a > quale behind vision. But it is not. And the object of normal vision is > not an image of any kind either. Neuroscientists may find inductive > correlations between seeing certain items (e.g. lines, corners, > curves) and brain activity. But finding such correlations is not the > same as reducing one to the other. It is the reduction that leads to a > muddle.
>
> Part IV ("On Method") has two key features. First is a sustained > argument against the reductionist impulse of contemporary > neuroscience. Second is an explicit articulation and defense of the > philosophical method that informs both the critique of reductionism > and the perspective of the book as a whole. For philosophers, this > second aspect will be the most interesting and surely controversial. >
> Francis Crick is one neuroscientist who wants to reduce the mental to > the physical. His "astonishing hypothesis" that we are "no more than > the behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated > molecules" (Francis Crick, The Astonishing Hypothesis, p. 3 (1995)) is > a good example of the sort of explanatory account of human action that > Bennett and Hacker reject as metaphysical nonsense. >
> In the course of reducing the mental to the physical, the normative > dimensions of social life are lost. Consider this example. Suppose I > place my signature on a document. The act of affixing my signature is > accompanied by neural firings in my brain. The neural firings do not > "explain" what I have done. In signing my name, I might be signing a > check, giving an autograph, witnessing a will or signing a death > certificate. In each case the neural firing may well be the same. And > yet, the meaning of what I have done in affixing my signature is > completely different in each case. These differences are "circumstance > dependent," not merely the product of my neural firings. Neural > firings accompany the act of signing but only the circumstances of my > signing, including the intention to do so, are the significant factors > in explaining what I have done.
>
> Bennett and Hacker conclude their book with two appendices, devoted to > a careful study of the work of Daniel Dennett and John Searle, > respectively. Dennett adopts the posture of Quine, specifically the > thought that philosophical problems can be solved through a > combination of scientific inquiry and empirical evidence (p. 414). > Dennett's attempt to explain intentionality as an interpretive > strategy is grounded in what he refers to as the > "Heterophenomenological Method." Bennett and Hacker argue that the > method is a non-starter because it is incoherent (p. 428). Similarly > with Dennett's attempt to compare our thinking to computer programs. >
> In the case of Searle, Bennett and Hacker find much with which they > agree. Cartesian dualism, behaviorism, identity theory, eliminative > materialism and functionalism are all rejected, and rightly so. Searle > advocates "biological naturalism," the view that consciousness is a > biological phenomenon, a proper subject of the biological sciences (p. > 444). Bennett and Hacker serve up no objection here. It is when Searle > claims that "mental phenomena are caused by neurophysiological > processes in the brain and are themselves features of the > brain" (Searle, Rediscovery, p. 1) that Bennett and Hacker demur. > Searle's claim commits the mereological fallacy discussed earlier. > Brains are no more conscious than they are capable of taking a walk or > holding a conversation. True, no animal could do either of these > things without a properly functioning brain. But it is the person, not > the brain, that engages in these activities.
>
> > I think they don't necessarily involve such a mistake. >
> Not necessarily, but perhaps. Just what do you think? >
> bruce
>
>
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| Topic: [Wittrs] [quickphilosophy] What aspect of language cannot be conventional |
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| [Wittrs] [quickphilosophy] What aspect of language cannot be conventional [message #5334] |
Fri, 30 July 2010 21:52 |
walto
Messages: 64
Registered: January 2010 |
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3.342 In our notions there is indeed something arbitrary, but this is not arbitrary: if we have determined something arbitrarily then something else must be the case. (This stems from the essence of the notation.)
3.3421 A particular way of symbolizing may be unimportant, but it is always important that this is a possible way of symbolizing. And it is like this in philosophy generally: the particular proves unimportant time and again, but the possibility of each particular gives us an insight into the essence of the world.
3.343 Definitions are rules for translation from one language into another. Every right sign-language must allow of translation into every other by means of such rules: This is what they must all have in common.
3.344 That which signifies in a symbol is the common feature of all symbols that can take its place following the rules of logical syntax.
W is claiming more here than that all languages must be representational or intentional; he is saying that, e.g., names in one language must correspond with names in another. Further, I think he's saying that, e.g., signs for items in "color space" or "music space" in any language must themselves somehow share in those spaces to do their work (he talks about gramophone grooves, musical scores, and acoustic sounds all sharing the same form). If the various linguistic signs don't share in the appropriate range of possibilities and impossibilities, their syntax (or grammar) will not allow them to perform all the functions necessary to the linguistic roles they're to play and they won't properly translate any signs that DO perform such functions.
Walto
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| Topic: [Wittrs] [quickphilosophy] An Ontological Prop in the 3's |
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| [Wittrs] [quickphilosophy] An Ontological Prop in the 3's [message #5323] |
Thu, 29 July 2010 15:39 |
walto
Messages: 64
Registered: January 2010 |
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3.328 If a sign is not used then it is meaningless. That is the point
[Sinn] of Occam's razor. (If everything behaves as if a sign had
meaning, then it has meaning.)
I take it the "meaning" above means "reference." But
this remains to me a highly cryptic prop.. I do think that to the
extent that one holds a theory of simple names of the sort W expounds in
TLP, you can tell what your ontology must do to satisfy Occam's
Razor. You will need to insist that the only things that (really) exist
are those that are named (by simple names). So, to give a complete list
of "what there is" one must supply a list of all the nameable
objectsand nothing else. The problem is that W doesn't give a
single example of an object.
It's a pretty theory, nevertheless. "There's a cat on the
mat" will still make sense, even if it's there's no cat on
the mat in question. But, on W's view, "Axelrod is on the
mat" will be nonsense if "Axelrod" is a simple name but
there is no Axelrod. So, "the cat" will make the cut only if
it's identical to some Axelrod or other.
Compare Quine, who says in "On What There Is" that to the extent
that the made-up "socratizes" can be used to dispense with all
sentences containing the name "Socrates" we need not count
Socrates as one of the indispensable elements of the universe. The
problem with this version of Quine's thesis, as Alston pointed out
in "Ontological Commitment," if the analyses and analysanda are
true in just the same cases, whatever one is committed to the other
would seem to be as well. But Alston's argument won't work
against the tractarian view, I don't think, because, for W, the
sentence itself displays its commitments by showing which of its
elements are simple names (those that are senseless if they don't
refer). If "Socrates" is a real name, "Socrates is F"
doesn't seem to be well paraphrased by "There's an X such
that X socratizes, X if F, and for all Y if Y socratizes then Y = X"
because it is simply a denial that "Socrates is F" is atomic.
Put it this way: Let "S is F" stand for a prop. If it is
paraphrasable in the manner described above, it is NOT an atomic prop.
But, using Quine's trick, any prop may be so paraphrased.
Therefore, either there are no atomic props or the paraphrase does not
work.. But W spends a good chunk of time and trouble attempting to
prove that there MUST be atomic props (though he can't or won't
give us any examples of them). If he has succeeded, then we know that
Quine's trick is defective.
What seems so paradoxical about W's ontological scheme here is that,
rather than pointing to science as the arbiter of what there is, he
points to meaning. He claims that the very possibility of determinate
statements/understanding requires that there be atomic props. But how
will we tell which props are atomic?? As I've said before, one of
the attractive things about the Tractatus is that it is so audacious.
Walto
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| Topic: [Wittrs] [quickphilosophy] Hacker on The Rise and Fall of the Picture Theory |
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| [Wittrs] [quickphilosophy] Hacker on The Rise and Fall of the Picture Theory [message #5304] |
Tue, 27 July 2010 19:01 |
walto
Messages: 64
Registered: January 2010 |
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What follows is (i) my summary of some of the salient points in
Hacker's 1981 paper; (ii) some excerpts from that paper on W's move
away from the picture theory; and (iii) a couple of comments of my own.
I continue to use the courier font for my own stuff and the georgia font
when I'm either quoting or nearly quoting (i.e., paraphrasing). I also
continue to use "W" for "Wittgenstein".
The basic premises utilized by W to end up with a picture theory of
representation are:
1. "Ordinary language is in order as it is" though this might
not always be readily apparent and might take analysis to show it.
I.e., it is consistent with the laws of logic that require bivalency
and excluded middle. Since so many ordinary language statements are
vague, this must be a function of vacuous proper names. These must be
handled by the Russellian Theory of Description and the Fregean
requirement of determinacy of sense. [Why such changes do not amount
to altering ordinary language rather than leaving it as it is, seems
odd to me.]
2. The sense of a prop does not generally determine its truth-value,
so knowing what something means will not generally require us to know
whether it is true or false. That a prop is false does not make it
meaningless. So, what makes a prop true can't be its sense alone.
3. Languages have generative powers, which means that props must be
composite. Only if props consist of elements can there be
rule-governed ways to generate an infinite number of new props out of
existing elements.
4. We do in fact understand thingsrepresentation is not only
possible, but actual.
It is isomorphism that is necessary to make 1-4 true. If we make a
model of a state of affairs, the model will represent in virtue of being
isomorphic with what it models. Elements of the model must stand for
the elements of what is represented. This, for W, is "the
pictorial relation."
Models represent states of affairs, with the structure of the latter
consisting in the way its constitutive elements are connected with each
other. For a model to represent some state of affairs, the elements of
the model must be arranged isomorphically with the elements of the
represented state of affairs, given the appropriate method of
projection.
A model is true if things are as the model represents them as being;
otherwise it's false, and to know whether some model is true or not,
it must be compared with reality.
There must be an internal relation between a model and what it
represents whether it represents truly or falsely. That is, the
"logical form" (or the multiplicity and combinatorial
possibilities) of the model and what it represents must be identical.
No model can represent its own (internal) relation to what it is a
model ofit can only display it. Propositions are a particular type
of model and so, too, must have a logical form matching what they
represent, whether they are true or false. Their logical form is what
is possible for them to say given the rules of logical syntax.
Hacker then says this regarding W's development after 1929:
In recent years there has been a justifiable reaction to the initial
conception of the relationship between W's two masterpieces. To be
sure there is profound change in his philosophy, but there is also
profound continuity. But exactly what changes and what continues is no
easy matter to discern. This is not surprising, for if what W has done
is rotate the axis of reference of his investigation 180 degrees [see
PI, sec. 108] then the difference of the sameness, as it were, will be
difficult to perceive
.
W continued to think that psychological features of thought processes
are logically irrelevant. In the PI, he insists repeatedly that mental
representations and accompanying experiences are irrelevant to sense
and understanding. The doctrine of avowals underlines the principle
that it must always be possible to distinguish being true from being
believed to be true, and the private language argument emphasizes the
necessity of the distinction between being right and believing oneself
to be right. So here we find an anti-psychologism, and affinity with
Realism, which, because of the criteria link neither involves the
Realist disregard for the conditions of possible knowledge as
determining the bounds of sense, nor slips into the typical
reductionism of Anti-realism.
Despite this affinity, however, een the anti-psychologism is
transformed. In the first place, it is no longer wedded to Realist
dogmasin particular the transcendence (as opposed to the
independence) of truth. In the second, the boundary between philosophy
and psychology has shifted dramatically. The Tractatus was tacitly or
explicitly committed to a host of psychological hypotheses about arcane
mental processes whose relation to reality was mediated by language.
Thought, understanding and belief, although they had a logical structure
similar to the proposition, and contained unknown psychic constituents,
were of no philosophical consequence (except in so far as sentences
like "A believes p" threaten the thesis of extensionality).
The assignment of meaning to indefinables, the forging of links between
language and reality, applying the method of projection are all mental
processes. How they are done is a matter for psychology; all that
concerns logic is that they are done. In the later work this is
repudiated. The subjects of meaning, understanding and thinking are
essential to a proper grasp of the nature of language. For the
relations between meaning that p, understanding `p' and the
ense of `p' are internal. Therefore no psychological
explanation or hypothesis can replace a philosophical account of these
relations
.
This
leads to the total repudiation of
the Realist dogma
of
the irrelevance to logic of the grounds of judgment. The grounds of
judgment, being what justify assertion, constitute at least in certain
cases, the sense of a proposition.. The grounds are grammatically
related to the proposition and tell us what proposition it is (Zettel,
sec. 437).
In short, the later philosophy replaces the Realist methodological
principles by diametrically opposed principles. The bounds of sense
and the limits of possible knowledge must coincide. We can squeeze no
more sense out of a proposition than we can put into one. We can
assign sense to a prop only in so far as we can stipulate the
conditions which would justify its employment. Consequently the crucial
strategic principle that sense is given by truth-conditions
independently of means of recognition of truth, which dominates the
Tractatus semantics, is not rejected
.[By the time of PI] the
grounds for an assertion are part of its grammar and tell us what
proposition it is. To specify the grounds for an assertion is to
explain its sense
.The contrast with the picture theory of meaning
here runs deep
.
Hacker's interesting paper concludes as follows:
To be sure, [PI's] answer to the great problem of the harmony
between language and reality seems, by comparison with the picture
theory of meaning and its exciting logico-metaphysical atomism,
trivial, even uninteresting. Madness is more interesting than sanity.
But it is much better to be sane than to be mad.
I just want to add my own sense that the continuing fascination of the
Tractatus among analytic philosophers likely stems from an unwillingness
(which I share) to drop Tractarian doctrines regarding the independence
of logic from epistemology and psychology (as described by Hacker
above) just because one wants to drop the atomism and the picture
theory of representation. I think the "ordinary language
philosopher's" use of "paradigm case" arguments and the
regular rejection of the distinction between ratio essendi and ratio
cognoscendi by W and his Oxford followers has been enough to cause many
analytic philosophers to look back longingly on the Tractatus with its
clear distinctions between what is being said and why one is saying it.
Hacker is right that is important not to yield to madness, but one must
also be careful that the treatment not be as harmful as the disease.
Walto
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| Forum: Wittgenstein's Life and Likings |
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| Topic: [Wittrs] [blog] Anthony Ryle's Account of Wittgenstein |
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| [Wittrs] [blog] Anthony Ryle's Account of Wittgenstein [message #2680] |
Sun, 13 December 2009 21:44 |
Squarespace Services
Messages: 14
Registered: October 2009 |
Junior Member |
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Sean Wilson <whoooo26505@yahoo.com> added Anthony Ryle's Account of Wittgenstein:
[continuing the series, "Wittgenstein at War, Again"]
John Ryle was the Regius Professor Physics at Cambridge. In 1940, he was helping Guy's Hospital in London prepare for the Blitz. He had helped Wittgenstein get a job at the hospital around September of 1941, so he, too, could assist with the civilian war effort. In early 1942, John Ryle took Wittgenstein to meet Ryle's family. There, Wittgenstein encountered the Ryle’s 14-year old son, Anthony, who recorded the following in his diary:
“Daddy and another Austrian (?) professor called Winkenstein (spelling?) arrived at 7:30. Daddy rather tired. Wink is awful strange – not a very good English speaker, keeps on saying ‘I mean’ and ‘its-tolerable’ meaning intolerable.
[Continuing at the end of next day: -- sw] In the morning Daddy, Margaret, goats, Tinker & I went for a walk. Frosty but sunny. Witkinstein spent the morning with the evacuees. He thinks we’re terribly cruel to them. We spent the afternoon argueing – he’s an impossible person everytime you say anything he says ‘No No, that’s not the point.’ It probably isn’t his point, but it is ours. A tiring person to listen to.
After tea I showed him round the grounds and he entreated me to be kind to the miserable little children – he goes far too much to the other extreme – Mommy wants them to be good citizens, he wants them to be happy.”
Source: Ray Monk, The Duty of Genius, 434-435.
Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq.
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| Topic: [Wittrs] [blog] Wittgenstein Labors at Guy's During WWII |
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| [Wittrs] [blog] Wittgenstein Labors at Guy's During WWII [message #2673] |
Sat, 12 December 2009 21:06 |
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Sean Wilson <whoooo26505@yahoo.com> added Wittgenstein Labors at Guy's During WWII:
[… continuing a segment that might be called, “Wittgenstein at War, Again.” – sw]
Wittgenstein thought it intolerable to teach philosophy during World War II when Britain was being blitzed. He wanted to help with the civilian war effort. In September of 1941, he therefore obtained a job at Guy’s Hospital in London, working as a dispensary porter. Monk writes,
“Wittgenstein’s job as a porter was to deliver medicines from the dispensary to the wards, where, according to John Ryle’s wife, Miriam, he advised the patients not to take them. His boss at the pharmacy was Mr. S F. Izzard. When asked later if he remembered Wittgenstein as a porter, Izzard replied, ‘Yes, very well. He came and worked here and after working here three weeks he came and explained how we should be running the place. You see, he was a man who was used to thinking.’ After a short while, he was switched to the job of pharmacy technician in the manufacturing laboratory, where one of his duties was to prepare Lassar’s ointment for the dermatological department. When Drury visited Wittgenstein at Guy’s, he was told by a member of the staff that no one before had produced Lassar’s ointment of such high quality. “ (433)
Wittgenstein’s work was physically grueling. He was 52 years old and had said to Rowland Hutt, “When I finish work about 5 … I’m so tired I often can hardly move.” (434).
Source: Ray Monk, The Duty of Genius, 433-434.
Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq.
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| Topic: [Wittrs] [blog] John Ryle on Ludwig Wittgenstein |
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| [Wittrs] [blog] John Ryle on Ludwig Wittgenstein [message #2603] |
Sun, 06 December 2009 20:07 |
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Sean Wilson <whoooo26505@yahoo.com> added John Ryle on Ludwig Wittgenstein:
During World War II when the Germans were regularly bombing Britain, Wittgenstein found it intolerable to teach philosophy. He wanted to assist with the civilian war effort. In September of 1941, he was able to arrange a lunch meeting with John Ryle about obtaining work at Guy’s Hospital where he could assist people in need. After meeting Wittgenstein, Ryle wrote a letter to his wife, saying …
“He is one of the world’s most famous philosophers …He wears an open green shirt and has a rather attractive face. I was so interested that after years as a Trinity don, so far from getting tarred with the same brush as the others, he is overcome by the deadness of the place. He said to me ‘I feel I will die slowly if I stay there. I would rather take a chance of dying quickly. And so he wants to work at some humble manual job in a hospital as his war-work and will resign his chair if necessary, but does not want it talked about at all. And he wants the job to be in a blitzed area. The works department are prepared to take him as an odd job man under the older workmen who do all the running repairs all over the hospital. I think he realizes that his mind works so differently to most people’s that it would be stupid to try for any kind of war-work based on intelligence. I have written to him tonight to tell him about this job but am not trying to persuade him unduly.”
Source: Ray Monk, The Duty of Genius, 431-432.
Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq.
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| Topic: [Wittrs] [blog] Hermine on Her Brother Becoming Wittgenstein |
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| [Wittrs] [blog] Hermine on Her Brother Becoming Wittgenstein [message #2416] |
Mon, 23 November 2009 11:48 |
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Sean Wilson <whoooo26505@yahoo.com> updated Hermine on Her Brother Becoming Wittgenstein:
Hermine observes the following changes in her brother ...
"Already at that time, a profound transformation was taking place in Ludwig, the results of which were not to be apparent until after the war, and which finally culminated in his decision not to possess any more wealth. ...
His second decision, to choose a completely unpretentious vocation and perhaps to become a country schoolteacher, was at first incomprehensible even to me. Since we, his brothers and sisters, very often communicated with each other in comparisons, I told him … that imagining him with his philosophically-trained mind as an elementary school teacher it was to me as if someone were to use a precision instrument to open crates. Thereupon Ludwig answered with a comparison which silenced me[,] for he said, "You remind me of someone who is looking through a closed window and cannot explain to himself the strange movements of a passer-by. He doesn’t know what kind of a storm is raging outside and that this person is perhaps only with great effort keeping himself on his feet." It was then that I understood his state of mind."
----- Hermine Wittgenstein
Sources: Rush Rhees, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Personal Recollections, Blackwell 1981 p. 4-5; Michael Nedo, Guy Moreton and Alec Finlay, “Ludwig Wittgenstein, There Where You are Not,” 2005, at p. 39.
Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq.
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| Topic: [Wittrs] [blog] On The Famous von Wright Photos |
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| [Wittrs] [blog] On The Famous von Wright Photos [message #2008] |
Thu, 29 October 2009 20:02 |
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Sean Wilson <whoooo26505@yahoo.com> added On The Famous von Wright Photos:
Here is a statement from the photographer of the famous photos of Wittgenstein and Georg Henrik von Wright in Cambridge in 1950. The photos were some of the last ever taken of Ludwig. (von Wright was Wittgenstein's successor at Cambridge and also one of his executors).
"In the late spring of 1950 we had tea with the von Wrights in the garden. It was a sunny day and I asked Wittgenstein if I could take a photograph of him. He said, yes, I could do that, if I would let him sit with his back to the lens. I had no objections and went to get my camera. In the meantime Wittgenstein had changed his mind. he now decided I was to take the picture in the style of a passport photograph, and von Wright was to sit next to him. Again I agreed, and Wittgenstein now walked off to get the sheet off his bed; he would not accept Elisabeth von Wright's offer of a fresh sheet from her closets. Wittgenstein draped the sheet, hanging it in front of the veranda and pulled up two chairs."
-- K.E. Tranoj [the "o" requires a special character I am unable duplicate here -- sw]
Sources: Michael Nedo, Michele Ranchetti, “Ludwig Wittgenstein, Sein Leben in Bildern und Texten, Suhrkamp,” 1983 at p. 471-473; and Michael Nedo, Guy Moreton and Alec Finlay, “Ludwig Wittgenstein, There Where You are Not,” 2005, at p. 84.
Here are the pictures, albeit a little cropped:
http://www.helsinki.fi/filosofia/VonWrightArchives/img001pieni.jpg (http://www.helsinki.fi/filosofia/VonWrightArchives/img001pieni.jpg)
http://www.kolumbus.fi/jukerk/wittgenstein_wright.jpg (http://www.kolumbus.fi/jukerk/wittgenstein_wright.jpg)
http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_yQs1YHZPurs/Rw-QZ0pv9rI/AAAAAAAAAHg/fTyGALlzqdA/s320 /Witt+and+von+Wright.jpg ( http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_yQs1YHZPurs/Rw-QZ0pv9rI/AAAAAAAAAHg/fTyGALlzqdA/s320 /Witt+and+von+Wright.jpg)
-- Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq.
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| Topic: [Wittrs] [blog] Joan Bevan's Account of Wittgenstein |
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| [Wittrs] [blog] Joan Bevan's Account of Wittgenstein [message #1990] |
Wed, 28 October 2009 17:05 |
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Sean Wilson <whoooo26505@yahoo.com> added Joan Bevan's Account of Wittgenstein:
John Bevan was Dr. Edward Bevan's wife. Wittgenstein had taken residence with Dr. Bevan after his cancer had reached a severe stage. Following his death, Mrs. Bevan had the following to say:
“My husband Edward met Maurice Drury in the war and they became very friendly, and in the course of their conversations he told Edward about Professor Wittgenstein … Shortly after his [Wittgenstein’s] return from America in the autumn of 1949 where he had been staying with the Norman Malcolms and had been taken ill – he sent for my husband – and from this encounter our friendship and close contact originated … . It was remarkable that he never discussed or tried to discuss with me, subjects which I did not understand, so that in our relationship I never felt inferior or ignorant. He was completely unconscious of his own appearance, he was very fussy about his personal cleanliness – but it was utterly without vanity. He seemed to know what was going on in the world though he never ever read the papers or listened to the news on the wireless. He was very demanding and exacting although his tastes were very simple. It was UNDERSTOOD that his bath would be ready, his meals on time and that the events of the day would run to a regular pattern."
-- Joan Bevan [allcaps substituted for italics in original; Paragrpahs condensed into one -sw]
Sources: Michael Nedo, Michele Ranchetti, “Ludwig Wittgenstein, Sein Leben in Bildern und Texten, Suhrkamp,” 1983 at p. 475; and Michael Nedo, Guy Moreton and Alec Finlay, “Ludwig Wittgenstein, There Where You are Not,” 2005, at p. 85.
Regards and thanks,
Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq.
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| Topic: [Wittrs] [blog] Wittgenstein's Family and Cancer |
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| [Wittrs] [blog] Wittgenstein's Family and Cancer [message #1889] |
Sat, 24 October 2009 18:45 |
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Sean Wilson <whoooo26505@yahoo.com> added Wittgenstein's Family and Cancer:
From Alexander Waugh's, The House of Wittgenstein: A Family at War, pp 275-276
After telling the story of Ludwig dying of prostate cancer; of his father, Karl, dying of cancer of the tongue and mouth; of Hermine, Ludwig's oldest sister, dying of gynecological cancer; and of Paul, Ludwig's brother, dying of prostrate cancer -- Waugh writes:
"If ever there were a case to show that cancer is a genetic disease, the Wittgenstein family should be submitted as the first exhibit of concluding proof. Eighteen months before Hermine's death Maria Salzer (Helene's daughter) was killed by cancer. [Helene is another of Ludwig's sisters -- sw] In time both Helene's daughters and several of her granddaughters as well as her great-granddaughters would be stricken by the same disease. Helene herself died of it in 1956. She had not seen her brother Paul since 1938."
Regards.
Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq.
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| Topic: [Wittrs] [blog] On Wittgenstein's Cancer and Death |
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| [Wittrs] [blog] On Wittgenstein's Cancer and Death [message #1855] |
Thu, 22 October 2009 18:39 |
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Sean Wilson <whoooo26505@yahoo.com> added On Wittgenstein's Cancer and Death:
... from Alexander Waugh's "The House of Wittgenstein: A Family at War" at 274-275. Describing his prostate cancer and its treatment (and assumed side effects). Also describing "a large portion" of On Certainty being composed during his final two-and-a-half months.
"Returning to London [in late 1949, after visiting Malcolm -- sw] he had himself checked again and was finally told the proper cause of his malaise. He had inoperable and advanced cancer of the prostate, which had spread to his bone marrow, causing anemia. The treatment, a regular oral administration of the female hormone estrogen, was prescribed to arrest his production of testosterone. The side effects of this therapy include sickness, diarrhea, hot flashes, impotence and breast swelling.
... Ludwig was himself expecting to die, but for a year after Hermine's demise he continued writing and moving from place to place. In April 1950, he went to Cambridge ... . By February [of 1951 --sw] his decline was such that it was decided any further treatment would be pointless. Bucked by this, Ludwig told Mrs. Bevan [, the wife of a doctor he was staying with --sw], 'I am going to work now as I have ever worked before.' Immediately he set about writing a large portion of the book now known as On Certainty. He made it (just) to his sixty-second birthday. 'Many happy returns!' said Mrs. Bevan. 'There will be no returns,' he answered. On the following morning he composed his last philosophical thought:
"Someone who dreaming says, 'I am dreaming,' even if he speaks audibly in doing so, is no more right than if he said in his dream 'it is raining,' while it was in fact raining. Even if his dream were actually connected with the noise of the rain."
That night Ludwig's condition deteriorated considerably and when Dr. Bevan told him that he was not likely do survive more than a couple of days he said, Good!" Before passing out for the last time he murmured to Mrs. Bevan: "Tell them I've had a wonderful life!" ... He was buried the next day (April 30, 1951) by Catholic rite in the cemetery of St. Giles, Cambridge."
Regards and thanks.
Sean Wilson
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| Topic: [Wittrs] [blog] What Wittgenstein's Extended Family Thought of His Genius |
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| [Wittrs] [blog] What Wittgenstein's Extended Family Thought of His Genius [message #1835] |
Wed, 21 October 2009 17:26 |
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Sean Wilson <whoooo26505@yahoo.com> added What Wittgenstein's Extended Family Thought of His Genius:
... from, the House of Wittgenstein, A Family at War, by Alexander Waugh. (pp. 146-147)
Regarding the sucess of the Tractatus, Waugh writes:
"From these small beginnings was the great industry of Wittgenstein exegesis born. Thousands of books have since been written to explain the meaning of the Tractatus, each different from the last. Ludwig himself later disavowed parts of it in his posthumously published Philosophical Investigations, but still this brief, gnomic work of the First World War continues to give the philosophical world a great deal of gristle to chew upon and in this sense, at least, the influence of Wittgenstein the philosopher has been considerable.
There were of course at that time (and still are, now) many doubters -- those who roll their eyes and mutter about "the Emperor's new clothes!" Ludwig's uncles, aunts and extended family of Austrian cousins were among those who were the least impressed. Many of them were simply embarrassed by what they perceived to be his eccentric behavior and thought it perverse that he, the dupe of the family -- an elementary school teacher -- should be honored as a great philosopher abroad. 'Shaking their heads, they found it amusing that the world was taken in by the clown of their family, that THAT useless person had suddenly become famous and an intellectual giant in England."
Regarding these passages, I am reminded of two things. The first is how aristocratic (and similar kinds of) families might deal so obsessively in the world of appearance. Secondly, how ordinary communities try to level genius or creativity that is nestled within it, as opposed to given unto it. That is, one would never really know some kinds of genius were it not in the newspapers to be cited by others. The herd is only ever cognizant of each other. I think we've all had a sense of what a community can do to a thinker whenever we go back home. I imagine every good college student understands that when coming home after a few years of study.
Regards and thanks.
Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq.
Assistant Professor
Wright State University
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| Topic: [Wittrs] Wittgenstein's Politics |
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| [Wittrs] Wittgenstein's Politics [message #666] |
Tue, 01 September 2009 18:00 |
Sean Wilson
Messages: 470
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I'm starting a new feature. Call it W's quote of the day.
We all know that Wittgenstein' s political views, like all his views, were complicated and hard to pin down. He would have leanings and attitudes suggesting of one idea that seemed "left" and then another that seemed not. Without getting into all of that, I found a quote last night in Culture and Value that I found rather ... uh, "wow." In one sense, though, it surely is wrong to take a person's private thoughts about politics in a diary-sort-of writing and to publish it, saying "this is what he believed." After all, we all think things that only reflect a momentary eruption. That's the key. W possessed a tumultuous and belligerent intellect -- he possessed a mind that would be a rage with intellectual energy. And so, with that qualification, I do want to note what he wrote in 1946 on page 50 in Culture and Value:
"The hysterical fear over the atom bomb now being experienced or at any rate expressed, by the public almost suggest that at last something really salutary has been invented. The fright at least gives the impression of a really effective bitter medicine. I can't help thinking: if this didn't have something good about it the "philistines" wouldn't be making an outcry. But perhaps this too is a childish idea. Because really all I can mean is that the bomb offers a prospect of the end, the destruction, of an evil -- our disgusting soapy water science. And certainly that's not an unpleasant thought; but who can say what would come after this destruction? The people now making speeches against producing the bomb are undoubtedly the SCUM of intellectuals, but even that does not prove beyond question that what they abominate is to be welcomed."
Note how he characterizes the intellectuals in the ban-the-bomb movement. I often wonder what Ludwig would have thought of the 60s generation in America (were he American). My sense is, he would have had blistering comments about certain forms of stupidity, but also, after the eruption passed, would have found some portion of it serene or worthy in its own context (as this seemed to have been the patterns of many of his eventual understandings) . In other words, he approaches politics like anything else -- a tempestuous art critic.
Regards.
Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq.
Assistant Professor
Wright State University
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| Topic: [Wittrs] Wittgenstein's Pedagogy |
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| [Wittrs] Wittgenstein's Pedagogy [message #496] |
Thu, 27 August 2009 16:39 |
Sean Wilson
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I always enjoy the stories of Wittgenstein's pedagogy. This is from Edward Kanterian, “Ludwig Wittgenstein.” p.127. (But see Malcom for the best treatment of this sort of thing.) I particularly like where he tells his students that attendance isn't like tourism.
“Wittgenstein had no handouts, did not read from a script and did not even have notes, since he considered a lecture based on such ‘material’ artificial and stale. However, he did make much use of the blackboard. He was unforgiving with those who came late and did not allow casual attendance. As he said, ‘My lectures are not for tourists.’ Since he had thought about the problems involved for a long time, he only prepared for a few minutes before the lecture, recapitulating the previous week’s results, then spoke freely and improvised, following one line of thought as it occurred to him there an then. His discourses, like his later writings, were illustrated with a wealth of vivid examples, striking metaphors and similes. he spoke with great authority and even when he struggled to find his words, or even remain silent for a long time, everybody had the impression that something important and groundbreaking was happening in their midst.
‘During these silences, Wittgenstein was extremely tense and active. His gaze was concentrated; his face was alive; his hands made arresting movements; his expression was stern. One knew that one was in the presence of extreme seriousness, absorption, and force of intellect.’ [quote from Malcolm’s book, p.25]. Often he would conduct a monologue with himself and not let anybody interrupt him. Then again, he would engage somebody from the audience in dialogue. He students were often frightened by him. Impatient and irascible, he forced them to formulate their thoughts in a precise way. “
Regards.
Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq.
Assistant Professor
Wright State University
Redesigned Website: http://seanwilson.org
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